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Abstract 
This research paper compares the nature and extent of risk disclosure practices between United 
Kingdom (UK) and Malaysian listed companies for the financial year of 2010. In addition, the 
relationships between the level ŽĨ ƌŝƐŬ ĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞƐ ĂŶĚ Ĩŝƌŵ ?Ɛ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ƐŝǌĞ ? ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ
classification, foreign listing status, country of domicile, level of risk and profitability are examined using 
multiple regression. Following a disclosure index study, both the UK and Malaysian companies are found 
to disclose more on financial risk information such as foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, credit risk 
and liquidity risk. The results show that most of the UK and Malaysian companies quantify the financial 
risk exposures compared to non-financial risk exposures. In addition, companies are found to disclose 
moderate amount of forward-looking risk information. Most of the companies have a specific section for 
reporting risk and risk management information. However, only a small proportion of companies have 
referred to risk appetite, the implementation of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) and the 
appointment of risk committee in the annual reports. In overall, UK companies disclose more risk 
information than Malaysian companies in almost every aspect of risk disclosures mentioned above, 
except for the disclosure on implementation of ERM and appointment of risk committee. The results 
from multiple regression show that size, foreign listing status and country of domicile are statistically 
significant in explaining the level of risk disclosure, measured in total disclosure index (TDI).  
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1. Introduction 
The importance of risk management has been placed with greater weight after the succession of 
high-profile company failures such as Enron, Barings Bank and Worldcom (Coles and Jones, 2004). In 
respond to the need for preventing fraudulent activities within the corporation, Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
2002 was then enacted to promote a higher standard of corporate governance in the Unites States (US).  
dŚŝƐƐŚŽǁƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĐŽƉĞŽĨĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ “ŚĂƐǁŝĚĞŶĞĚƚŽĞŵďƌĂĐĞƚŚĞƌŝƐŬƐƚŚĂƚĂĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ
ƚĂŬĞƐ ?  ?ŝĐŬŝŶƐŽŶ, 2001, p.360). The corporate failures further contribute to the emergence of 
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) which is referred to a systematic and integrated approach of 
managing all risks and their interactions in order to maximize the wealth of shareholders (Dickinson, 
2001). In year 2004, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) 
had published a framework as guidance for companies in implementing ERM.  In the UK, the issuances 
of UK Corporate Governance Code and the Turnbull Report have addressed the importance of an 
effective risk management and internal control systems.  
Other than the pressure for a better corporate governance structure and the importance of 
embedding a risk management system within the organization, there is a demand from the public for a 
more transparent risk disclosure, particularly from the investors (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). A greater 
transparency in risk disclosure improves ƚŚĞ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ? investment decisions as they are able to assess 
the risk profile of the company through the information made available to them (Linsley and Shrives, 
2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Hassan, 2009). By reducing information asymmetry, investors will 
demand for a lower risk premium and this benefits the company from a lower cost of capital (Dobler, 
2005a). Subsequent calls for increased risk disclosures have come from the regulatory bodies and 
accounting institutions which have issued provisions and guidelines in promoting for a better 
communication of risk information by companies to the public. Of these, the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) had published several discussion papers which seek to close 
the risk information gap as well as to minimize the risk of fraud.  Despite the urge for a transparent risk 
disclosure from various parties, the subprime mortgage crisis occurred during the summer 2007 shows 
that the level of risk management across the organization remains low as well as the lack of 
transparency in risk reporting (Simkins and Ramirez, 2008).  
Most of the empirical studies have been conducted on risk disclosure of non-financial companies 
are either country-specific or industry specific. Insofar, there are no prior studies that examine the risk 
disclosure in a cross-country context. As suggested by Linsley and Shrives (2006) for future research 
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study on risk disclosures in a cross-country setting, this paper aims to explore the variability of risk 
disclosures in the annual reports from UK and Malaysian companies. This research paper compares the 
nature and extent of risk disclosure practices between UK and Malaysian listed companies for the 
financial year of 2010. In addition, the relationships between the level ŽĨ ƌŝƐŬ ĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞƐ ĂŶĚ Ĩŝƌŵ ?Ɛ
characteristics such as size, industry classification, foreign listing status, country of domicile, level of risk 
and profitability are examined.  
 This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the concept of risk, risk classification and 
risk management. This is followed by a review of the current risk regulations in the UK and Malaysia. 
Section 4 then locates the prior empirical literature on risk disclosures. Hypotheses are then developed 
in section 5. The subsequent section describes the sample selection and research design employed for 
this study. Section 7 presents the empirical results and discussion. Lastly, section 8 concludes.    
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2. Risk, Risk Classification and Risk Management 
2.1 Risk 
The concept and definition of risk have received considerable debate in the recent decade 
(Linsley and Shrives, 2006). Risk is often viewed to be bad in the past, whereas risk is now seen as a two-
fold nature for which positive and negative events might turn out to be (Vandemaele et al, 2009). 
According to Turnbull Report  ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ƌŝƐŬ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ Ăůů ĂďŽƵƚ  ‘ďĂĚ ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ŚĂƉƉĞŶŝŶŐ ? ŝƚ ĂůƐŽ ŵĞ ŶƐ  ‘ŐŽŽĚ
ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ŶŽƚ ŚĂƉƉĞŶŝŶŐ ? ? /AEW, on the other hand, refers to ƌŝƐŬ ĂƐ  “ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ĂƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĂŵŽƵŶƚ ŽĨ
ďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ? ?ƚĂŬĞŶĨƌŽŵFRS 5: Reporting the substance of transaction. Uncertainty, in this case, includes 
both upside risks (potential for gains) and downside risks (exposure to losses). It is suggested that the 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ŶŽƚ ĂĚŽƉƚ Ă  ‘ůŽƉ-ƐŝĚĞĚ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?  ?DŽŚŽďďŽƚ ĂŶĚ EŽƌŝǇƵŬŝ ?  ? ? ? ? ). In fact, the 
management is encouraged to exploit the opportunities by focusing on risk and control rather than 
paying attention to only a few sources of uncertainty (ICAEW, 1999; Mohobbot and Noriyuki, 2005). 
Risk can also be seen as volatility since the actual cash flows are subject to uncertainty from 
period to period (Mohobbot and Noriyuki, 2005). Crouhy et al. (2006, p.25) then ĚĞĨŝŶĞ ƌŝƐŬ ĂƐ  “ƚŚĞ
ǀŽůĂƚŝůŝƚǇŽĨƌĞƚƵƌŶƐ ůĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŽƵŶĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ůŽƐƐĞƐ ?ǁŝƚŚŚŝŐŚĞƌǀŽůĂƚŝůŝƚǇ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŶŐŚŝŐŚĞƌƌŝƐŬ ? ?There is 
no point to eliminate all the risks facing the company since some risks need to be undertaken in order to 
make a profit (ICAEW, 1999). In fact, risk should be managed in a cost-effective way to increase the 
likelihood for better outcomes and decrease the likelihood of worse results (ICAEW, 1999). 
2.2 Risk Classification 
It is imperative to classify risk in order to achieve comparability in risk reporting (Mohobbot and 
Noriyuki, 2005). While there are many ways to categorize risk, the researcher follows the risk 
categorization model built by Crouhy et al. (2006). According to Crouhy et al. (2006), risks are grouped 
into financial risks and non-financial risks. Financial risk comprises market risk, liquidity risk and credit 
risk whilst non-financial risks refer to operational risk, legal, tax and regulatory risk and business, 
strategic and reputation risk.  
2.2.1 Market Risk 
Market risk arises when the changes in market-determined prices and rates result in a change in 
the cash flow and/or earnings (Culp, 2001). It is driven by the exposures from interest rate, foreign 
exchange rate and commodity prices (Vandemaele et al., 2009).  
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2.2.2 Liquidity Risk 
Liquidity risk arises in the event that a company is unable to meet its obligation as they fall due 
(Culp, 2001). /ƚĐĂŶďĞĂ “ĨĂƚĂů ?ƌŝƐŬĂƐĐŽŵƉĂŶǇĐĂŶŐŽŝŶƚŽďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇŝŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚŽĨĨĂĐŝŶŐĞǆƚƌĞŵĞ
liquidity problem (Chapman, 2006). It is therefore imperative to ensure that the cash obligations such as 
rents, salaries and taxes can be met on time for a company to remain solvent (Crouhy et al., 2006).  
2.2.3 Credit Risk 
Credit risk refers to the risk of which counterparties may be unable to fulfill contractual 
obligations on schedule (Culp, 2001; Pickford, 2001). Giesecke (2004, p. 3) indicated that examples of 
ĐƌĞĚŝƚƌŝƐŬ “ƌĂŶŐĞĨƌŽŵĂŐĞŶĐǇĚŽǁŶŐƌĂĚĞƐƚŽĨĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽƐĞƌǀŝĐĞĚĞďƚƚŽůŝƋƵŝĚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? 
2.2.4 Operational risk 
KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƌŝƐŬ ŝƐ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ  “ŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞ Žƌ ĨĂŝůŝŶŐ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ? ƉĞŽƉůĞ ĂŶĚ
ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ Žƌ ƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ĞǀĞŶƚƐ ?  ?sĂŶĚĞŵĂĞůĞ Ğƚ Ăů ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? Ɖ ? ? ) ? &Žƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ĨĂŝůƵƌĞƐ ŝŶ
computer systems impede the information access and hence cause disruption in the operations 
(Vandemaele et al., 2009). Besides that, operational risk arises when the management fails to perform 
their duties, either they engage in fraud activities or they do not have the expertise in carrying their 
tasks (Culp, 2001).  
2.2.5 Legal, Tax and Regulatory Risk 
Legal, tax and regulatory risk include the involvement in lawsuits and changes in legislation and 
regulatory, tax law and political environment (Vandemaele et al., 2009).   
2.2.6 Business, Strategic and Reputation Risk 
ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ƌŝƐŬ ƌĞĨĞƌƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  “ƚǇƉŝĐĂů ƌŝƐŬƐ Ă ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ĨĂĐĞƐ P ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ĚĞŵĂŶĚ ĨŽƌ
products, the price that can be charged for those products, the cost of producing, stocking and 
delivering the pƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ ? ?sĂŶĚĞŵĂĞůĞĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ) ? 
^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ƌŝƐŬ ƌĞĨĞƌƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  “ƌŝƐŬ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ initial strategy selection, execution or 
modification over time, resulting in a lack of achievement of overall objectives ? ?Chapman, 2006, p.225).  
Reputation risk emerges after the major corporate scandals such as Enron and Barings Bank 
(Crouhy et al., 2006). It is ƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽƚŚĞ “ƌŝƐŬƚŚĂƚĂŐŽŽĚƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶ ůĞĂĚƚŽǀĂůƵĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶ ?
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ƚƵƌŶƐƚŽĂďĂĚƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ ?ĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ ?ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇǀĂůƵĞďĞŝŶŐĚĞƐƚƌŽǇĞĚ ? (Vandemaele et al., 2009, 
p.3).  
2.3 Risk Management  
Risk management refers to a process which seeks to assist the management teams to evaluate 
and take action on all their risks with a view to increasing the profitability of their success and reducing 
the likelihood of failure (ICAEW, 1999). Besides that, the need to manage risks for a corporation also 
comes from the pressure to justify the underlying corporate decision and to disclose risk management 
policies to meet the standards of corporate governance. Risk management requires a detailed 
understanding and knowledge of the business operations within the organization. Although companies 
are not obliged to establish a risk management system, it is essential for all organization, large or small 
(Woods et al., 2008). As the risks exposed to a company become more and more complicated, 
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) emerges as a systematic and integrated approach of managing all 
risks and their interactions in order to maximize the wealth of shareholders (Dickinson, 2001). 
Traditional risk management system views the risks that a company faces in isolation while ERM 
aggregate them and treat them in a holistic manner (Meulbroek, 2002). As suggested by Chapman 
(2008), risks are now more complex, dynamic and highly interdependent and therefore cannot be 
treated separately. Chapman (2008) further stresses the importance for a company to evaluate the 
impact of one risk group to another and to effectively manage the interdependencies between the risks 
as a whole. This is because company can produce natural hedging when the risks facing the company are 
not correlated to each other (Trieschmann et al., 2005).  
2.3.1 Benefits of Enterprise Risk Management 
Meulbroek (2002) indicated that ERM increases the firm value which in turn maximizes the 
shareholder value by means of reducing the expected costs of financial distress, the underinvestment 
problem, risks imposed to contracting parties, and expected taxes.  
Reduction in Expected Costs of Financial Distress 
 Harrington and Niehaus (2003) state that managing risks facing the company can reduce the 
probability of firms encountering financial distress and ƚŚĞƌĞďǇƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐƚŚĞǀĂƌŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĨŝƌŵ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞ
value. Given a low probability of encountering financial distress, risk management augments firm value 
even further by increases the availability of external funds and reduces the costs of borrowing (Bartram, 
2000). This is because interest payment of debt is subjected to interest tax shield and therefore the 
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after-tax profit will be higher if the firm has a higher financial leverage. The magnitude of cost reduction 
is closely related to the probability of a firm encountering financing distress and the associated expected 
costs of financial distress (for example, bankruptcy costs and the legal costs involved). Nance et al. (1993, 
Ɖ ? ? ? ? )ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ “ƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĨŝƌŵĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŝ ŐĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĚŝƐƚƌĞƐƐŝƐĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ
ƐŝǌĞŽĨƚŚĞĨŝƌŵ ?ƐĨŝǆĞĚĐůĂŝŵƐƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƚŽƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨ ŝƚƐĂƐƐĞƚƐ ? ?dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?Ĩŝƌŵs with high amount of 
fixed claims has a higher chance of default, hence, benefit more from risk management.  
Reduction of Underinvestment Problem 
 Myers (1997) indicated that firms with fixed claims as part of their capital structure, taking a 
positive net present value (NPV) project, reduce ƚŚĞƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?ǁĞĂůƚŚĂƐƚŚe gains accrue primarily 
to bondholders. This is because bondholders must be paid before the shareholders for any funds issued 
by the company. As a result, shareholders have the incentive to either under invest in positive NPV 
project or invest in negative NPV project with high risk (Harrington and Niehaus, 2003). The problem is 
particularly severe when the company is heavily financed with debt and the firm value is volatile 
(Bartram, 2000). The reason for which shareholders will under invest in a positive NPV project is because 
the profits gained from the project will be used to satisfy the bondholders before the shareholders 
(Bartram, 2000). On the contrary, shareholder will undertake negative NPV project even though the risk 
associated is high because shareholders have little to lose if the high risk project turns out to be 
unsuccessful. However, shareholders receive high returns if the project turns out to be profitable 
(Harrington and Niehaus, 2003). Nance at al. (1993) stated that this will therefore induce the potential 
bondholders to lower their offer price as a consequent of the potential opportunistic behaviors by the 
shareholders.  To resolve this problem, risk management helps. For example, Bessembinder (1991, p. 
519) indicated that hedging as a risk management tool increases ƚŚĞ Ĩŝƌŵ ?ƐǀĂůƵĞas it  “ĚĞĐƌĞĂƐĞƐ ƚŚĞ
sensitivity of senior claim value to incremental investment, allowing equity holders to capture a larger 
portion of the incremental benefit froŵŶĞǁŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ?. Besides that, hedging can assure bondholders 
that transfer of wealth to shareholders will not take place, hence, the future bond payments issued to 
bondholders are guaranteed, thereby, firms can increase their offer prices in the market.  
Reduction of Risk Imposed to Contracting Parties 
 Several contracting parties to the firms such as managers, suppliers, customers and employees 
might not be able diversify their risks associated with their respective claims on the company. Therefore, 
these parties require extra compensations for them to bear the nondiversifiable risk associated with 
their claims. For example, suppliers might insist on tighter trade credit terms while shareholders might 
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require a higher dividend payout. Harrington and Niehaus (2003) therefore suggest that company with a 
good risk management system will be able to improve the contracting terms with the respective 
contracting parties. For example, suppliers are more likely to offer a lower price of inputs to the 
company if they are confident that the company is very unlikely to bankrupt in the near future. This is 
especially true for which the contracting party need to incur a huge investment cost specific to a 
particular transaction.    
Reduction in Expected Taxes 
 Nance et al. (1993) stated that both the progressive corporate tax schedule and the tax preference 
items (for example, investment tax credits, tax loss carry forwards, and foreign tax credits) cause the 
effective tax schedule to be convex. As risk management can reduce the volatility of pre-tax income, it 
therefore reduces the taxes of a firm in the presence of convex tax regime. 
2.3.2  The Risk Management Process 
In general, there are five key steps for which a sound risk management is established 
(Harrington and Niehaus, 2003).  
The first step involves the identification and prioritization of the relevant and significant risks 
that are facing the company. Significant risks are those that regarded as potentially hindering the 
achievemeŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ? >ůŽǇĚƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶŽŵŝƐƚ/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ hŶŝƚ ĨŽƵŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ
approximately 20% of the companies surveyed suffered from significant losses for not identify and 
ŵĂŶĂŐŝŶŐƌŝƐŬĂŶĚ ? ?A?ŚĂĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚĂƚůĞĂƐƚŽŶĞ “ŶĞĂƌŵŝƐƐ ? ?^ŝŵŬŝŶƐĂŶĚZĂŵŝƌĞǌ ? ? ? ? ? ) 
Companies should identify the sources of risk that are specific to the industry sector and 
circumstances of the company and to avoid the situation of risk identification overload as this can lead 
to the board paying insufficient attention to prevent the significant ones (ICAEW, 1999). A risk mapping 
diagram shown in Figure 1 helps the boards to prioritize the identifiable risks according to their impact 
and likelihood (ICAEW, 1999). There are four ratings (A, B, C and D) given in a risk mapping diagram. 
These ratings can be interpreted as: 
A Immediate action 
B Consider action and have a contingency plan 
C Consider action 
D Keep under periodic review 
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As seen in the diagram, not all risks are regarded as significant. Significant risks should be given 
immediate attention while the non-significant one should be reviewed regularly to make sure that they 
remain non-significant.  
 
Figure 1. Risk Mapping 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 [Source: ICAEW, 1999. Page 16.] 
The second step involves the estimation of the potential frequency and severity of losses of the 
identifiable sources of risk. Mohobbot and Noriyuki (2005) suggested a number of measurements to 
evaluate the impact of potential risk such as sensitivity analysis and value-at-risk (VaR). They further 
argued that there is no single best fit measure that can accommodate companies across different 
industries, even for companies within the same industry.  Companies that are better at estimating the 
potential risks will be able to allocate their sources of capital in a cost effective way (ICAEW, 1997).  
  The next step involves development of risk management strategy and selection of the risk 
management tools available to the company.  The risk management policy document should be the one 
ƚŚĂƚĚĞĨŝŶĞƐĐůĞĂƌůǇƚŚĞďŽĂƌĚ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽƌŝƐŬĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌƌŝƐŬĂƉƉĞƚŝƚĞĨŽƌǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĂďůĞƌŝƐŬƐĂƌĞ
prepared to be accepted (ICAEW, 1999). Risk appetite refers to the type and amount of risks which the 
boards are willing to take.  
The following step involves implementation of the risk management methods chosen.  
According to Harrington and Niehaus (2003), there are three major methods of risk management. As 
seen in figure 2, these methods refer to loss control, loss financing and internal risk reduction. Loss 
control refers to the techniques and strategies that seek to control the frequency (loss prevention) 
Impact 
of risk 
High impact 
Low likelihood 
 B 
Likelihood of risk occurring 
High impact 
High likelihood 
 A 
Low impact 
Low likelihood 
D 
Low impact 
High likelihood 
C 
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and/or severity of loss (loss reduction) and other undesirable effects of risk (Williams Jr. et al, 1998). 
Loss financing tools, on the other hand, includes self-insurance, insurance purchases from insurers, 
hedging with financial instruments and other risk transfer methods. These are the methods used to 
offset the losses incurred. Lastly, companies can reduce their risk exposures internally. This can be done 
by diversifying their activities and/or invest in information to obtain superior forecasts of expected 
losses.     
Figure 2. Major Risk Management Methods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Source: Harrington and Niehaus (2003). Page 9.] 
The final step involves monitoring and reviewing risk management systems. Crouhy et al. (2006) 
indicated the roles of the board to fulfill its risk governance responsibilities. They mentioned the need 
for the board to ensure the risk management system in place is consistent with the risk appetite choices 
and the effectiveness of the risk management system for which optimal risks can be kept. Nevertheless, 
this stage does not involves only the commitment of the top management in monitoring and reviewing 
the risk management system, Simkins and Ramirez (2008, p. 587) see the importance for company to 
appoint the chief risk officer and/or risk committee to govern the existing risk management system as 
ƚŚĞ ďŽĂƌĚ  “ĐŽƵůĚ ũƵƐƚ ĂƐ ĞĂƐŝůǇ ďĞ ƚĞŵƉƚĞĚ ƚŽ ŚĂƌǀĞƐƚ ĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚ ĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ Ɖƌofits 
ƚŽĚĂǇ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉĞŶƐĞ ŽĨ ůĂƌŐĞ ƌŝƐŬƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽŵŽƌƌŽǁ ? ? /Ŷ ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŚĞ ZK ĂŶĚ ƌŝƐŬ
committee also play a role in implementing and coordinating the ERM system (Dickinson, 2001). Despite 
the commitment of the top management in maintaining an effective risk management system, feedback 
Loss control 
Reduced Level of  
Risk Activity 
Increase Precaution 
Loss Financing 
Retention and 
Self-Insurance 
Insurance 
Hedging 
Other contractual  
Risk Transfer 
Internal Risk Reduction 
Diversification 
Investment in 
Information 
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and suggestion from the lower management is also crucial for the purpose of evaluating the risk 
management strategy and should be reported to the board and internal audit function (Culp, 2001). 
Turner (1994) stressed the importance of cultivating Ă  ‘ŶŽ-ďůĂŵĞ ? ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶwhere 
failures and near misses should not be seen as occasions for shame or to be blamed (Turner, 1994). In 
fact, it should be seen as an opportunity to learn and for the management to improve the operation 
systems as well as to uncover failure preconditions that could potentially trigger a disaster (Turner, 
1994).  
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3. Current Risk Regulations on Risk Disclosures 
3.1  Risk Disclosures Regulations in UK  
As the importance of risk reporting emerges, several accounting institutions and regulatory 
bodies had published reports with respect to these issues. These include the UK Corporate Governance 
Code issued by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) which is also annexed to the listing rules required 
by the London Stock Exchange (LSE), discussion papers issued by ICAEW and International Financial 
Accounting Standards (IFRS) issued by International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). 
3.1.1 The UK Corporate Governance Code 
The first report addressing the need for maintaining an effective internal control system to 
minimize the risk of fraud was the Cadbury Report issued in year 1992. The Cadbury Report (1992) 
provided recommendations on four main areas: the board of directors, non-executive directors, 
executive directors and reporting and controls. With respect to the recommendation on reporting and 
controls, the ĂĚďƵƌǇZĞƉŽƌƚ ? ? ? ? ? )ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĞĚƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐƐŚŽƵůĚŵĂŬĞĂƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞ
report and accounts on the effectiveness of their system of internal control and that the auditors should 
ƌĞƉŽƌƚƚŚĞƌĞŽŶ ? ?ĂĚďƵƌǇZĞƉŽƌƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ). The Cadbury Code was then annexed to the listing rules 
in year 1993 (Chapman, 2006). 
In year 1998, the Combined Code of Corporate Governance (the Code), which is now called the 
UK Corporate Governance Code, was issued to review the implementation of the Cadbury Code and to 
provide further recommendations set out in the Cadbury Report (1992). The code consists of Main 
Principles which is associated with the provision as a guide to the companies in applying the respective 
principle. The code then superceded the Cadbury Code as the listing rules to be met by the listed 
companies (Chapman, 2006). The Code proposed the requirements for which the companies should 
follow in order to maintain a sound system of internal control and risk management system. This is set 
out in Provision C.2.1 that, 
 “dŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐƐŚŽƵůĚ ?Ăƚ ůĞĂƐƚĂŶŶƵĂůůǇ ?ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĂƌĞǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞŐƌŽƵƉ ?ƐƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨ
internal control and should report to shareholders that they have done so. The review should cover all 
ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůĐŽŶƚƌŽůƐ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ?ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůƐĂŶĚƌŝƐŬŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? 
 This provision still stands in the latest version of the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 and it 
is now named as the Provision D.2.1.  
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 The Code adopts the  “ĐŽŵƉůǇŽƌĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ?Ăpproach as it realized that the nature of risks facing 
the company, the size of the company and its complexity vary from one to another. While the listing 
rules require the companies to apply the Main Principles set out in the Code, companies are not 
restricted to adopt the alternative to following the associated provision. The company, however, will 
need to justify the reason for any non-compliance.   
  
3.1.2 ICAEW Discussion Papers 
Subsequent calls for increased risk disclosure have come from the discussion paper published by 
ƚŚĞ/tŝŶǇĞĂƌ ? ? ? ? ?/tƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚĂĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƉĂƉĞƌ “&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůZĞporting of Risk: Proposals for 
Ă^ƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƵƐŝŶĞƐƐZŝƐŬ ? ?dŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌƌĞǀĞĂůƐƚŚĞůĂĐŬŽĨƌŝƐŬŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚǁĂƐĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ
annual reports and demands the companies to enhance their existing risk reporting systems. The ICAEW 
proposes the set of risks to be reported by the companies together with a set of techniques to quantify 
risks. 
/Ŷ ǇĞĂƌ  ? ? ? ? ? /t ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ƉĂƉĞƌ “EŽ ^ƵƌƉƌŝƐĞs  W The Case for Better 
Risk Reporting to address the concern of the managers who deemed that the benefits obtained from 
lower cost of capital did not outweigh the potential cost of disclosure (Woods et al., 2008). The potential 
ĐŽƐƚƐ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ  “ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽƉƌŝĞƚary costs of information retrieval and non-proprietary costs of disclosing 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůůǇ ƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ŽĨ ǀĂůƵĞ ƚŽ ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŽƌƐ ?  ?DŽŚŽďďŽƚ ĂŶĚ
Noriyuki, 2005, p.8). ICAEW recommended that companies can choose to omit the commercially 
sensitive risk information which potentially places them into a situation of competitive disadvantage. 
dŚĞƚŚŝƌĚĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƉĂƉĞƌ “EŽƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞƐ PtŽƌŬŝŶŐĨŽƌďĞƚƚĞƌƌŝƐŬƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ ?ǁĂƐŝƐƐƵĞĚŝŶǇĞĂƌ
2002. ICAEW stressed the importance of risk reporting as this will benefit the companies for a lower cost 
of capital as well as enhancing the current risk management system (Mohobbot and Noriyuki, 2005). 
Besides that, ICAEW also ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ ƚŚĞ  “dƵƌŶďƵůů ZĞƉŽƌƚ ŽŶ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů ĐŽŶƚƌŽů P 'ƵŝĚĂŶĐĞ ĨŽƌ
directors on ƚŚĞ ŽŵďŝŶĞĚ ŽĚĞ ?in year 1999 which aim to provide guidance to the companies in 
applying the provision C.2.1 of the Code which mentioned in the above section. FRC then updated the 
Turnbull Report in year 2005 with only a small number of changes has been made. In the report itself, 
the board and investors indicated that the guidance, which was first issued in year 1999, has improved 
the overall standard of risk management and internal control significantly (Turnbull Report, 2005).  
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3.1.3 International Financial Reporting Standards 
UK listed companies are obliged to adhere to IFRS issued by IASB as required by the Company 
Act 2006. There are three standards which listed companies are required to comply with when dealing 
with financial instruments. These are IAS 32: Presentation, IFRS 7: Financial Instruments  W Disclosures 
and IFRS 9: Financial Instruments. While IAS 32 provides guidance on presenting the risk information 
related to financial instruments, IFRS 7, on the other hand, provides guidance on the extent of disclosure 
ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ ĞǆƉŽƐƵƌĞ ƚŽ ƌŝƐŬ ?Furthermore, IASB aims to 
replace all the requirements of IAS 39: Financial Instruments  W Recognition and Measurement by IFRS 9 
from 2013. Nevertheless, both the IAS 39 and IFRS 9 are adopted by the companies concurrently.  
3.2 Risk Disclosures Regulations in Malaysia 
3.2.1 Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
The introduction of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance was issued in year 2000 to 
identify and address weaknesses highlighted by the Asian financial crisis. It is then revised in year 2007 
with a few key amendments to promote a better corporate governance structure. The Code set out the 
principles and best practices that aim to ensure the stakeholders are able to assess sufficient disclosure 
ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ (Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance, 2007). Similar to the UK Corporate Governance Code, the Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance consists of the main principles and the associated best practices which served as a guideline 
to assist the companies in applying the associated principle. The listed companies on the exchange 
(Bursa Malaysia) are required by the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia (Paragraph 15.26) to report 
in their annual reports how they have applied the principles and the extent to which they have complied 
with the best practices. Company will need to justify and explain for any departure from the best 
practices set out in the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance. dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  “ĐŽŵƉůǇ Žƌ
ĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ? ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ƐĞƚ ŽƵƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ h< ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ 'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ŽĚĞ ?In the event that companies fail to 
disclose the matters in its annual report, Bursa Malaysia can take action against the companies as set 
out in the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia. According to the Code, the management is 
 “ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ ĨŽƌ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ĨŽƌ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇŝŶŐ ? ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŶŐ ? ŵŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ Žf 
risks and internal controls and for providing assurance to the board that the processes have been carried 
ŽƵƚ ? ?DĂůĂǇƐŝĂŶŽĚĞŽĨŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞďŽĂƌĚ ?ŽŶƚhe other hand, need to oversee 
and review the existing risk management system to ensure its adequacy.  
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3.2.2 Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia 
The Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia (paragraph 15.27(b)) requires the board of a listed 
company to provide a statement of internal control as being practiced by the company. The Bursa 
DĂůĂǇƐŝĂ ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ Ă ƉĂƉĞƌ  “^ƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ŽŶ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂů ŽŶƚƌŽů-Guidance for Directors of Public Listed 
CompaniĞƐ ? ? dŚŝƐ ƉĂƉĞƌ provides guidance to the board in disclosing information related to internal 
control in accordance with the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia. The guidelines recommended in 
this paper derived from the Turnbull Report and International Standards on Auditing (ISA). Therefore, 
the information disclosed in the statement of internal control from both UK and Malaysian companies 
should not depart from each other significantly. Besides that, Bursa Malaysia also requires the listed 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐƚŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞĂŚĂŝƌŵĂŶ ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞĂŶŶƵĂůƌĞƉŽƌƚĂŶĚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐŚŽƵůĚŝŶĐůƵĚĞ “Ă
brief descƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ƚƌĞŶĚƐ ĂŶĚ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ Ă ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŐƌŽƵƉ ?Ɛ
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ǇĞĂƌ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ƵŶĚĞƌůǇŝŶŐ ŝƚƐ ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ĂŶĚ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?
(Amran et al. 2009, p. 42) 
3.2.3 Financial Reporting Standards 
Malaysian listed companies need to adhere to Financial Reporting Standards (FRS) issued by 
Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) as required by the Company Act 1965. Starting from 
2006 where Malaysia agreed to adopt a policy of convergence, all the standards issued by MASB are 
ƚŚĞŶ “ǁŽƌĚ-for-ǁŽƌĚ/&Z^ ? ?ZK^, 2005, p. 23). Therefore, there are no major differences between FRS 
and IFRS although both standards have different numbering. MASB issued FRS 132: Financial 
Instruments  W Disclosure and Presentation (which is identical to IAS 32) in year 2006. While IAS 32 had 
been issued in year 1996 by International Accounting Standards Committee (which is now called the 
IASB), Malaysian companies start to adopt it only from year 2006 onwards.   
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4. Risk Disclosure Literature 
Prior empirical studies on risk disclosure can be categorized into three strands. The first strand 
of risk disclosure literature examines the nature, extent and location of risk information disclosed in the 
annual reports. The second strand of risk disclosure literature examines the usefulness of risk 
information from the view of various stakeholders. Finally, there are a number of studies that 
investigate the determinants of the level of risk disclosure.  
4.1 Nature, Extent and Location of Risk Disclosure 
 In the United States (U.S.), most of the studies on risk disclosures were market-risk based after 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued Financial Reporting Release Number 48 (FRR No. 
48) on Derivative and Market Risk Disclosures in January 1997 (Amran et al. 2009). FRR No. 48 required 
the SEC registrants to disclose qualitative and quantitative risk information about their exposures to 
changes in interest rates, foreign currency exchange rates, and commodity prices in notes to the 
financial statements and Management, Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section (Linsmeier and Pearson, 
1997; Roulstone, 1999). Roulstone (1999) examined the impact of FRR No. 48 on derivatives and market 
risk disclosures made by 25 SEC registrants. He found an improvement in the qualitative and 
quantitative of market risk disclosure, however, most of the companies disclosing only the minimum 
requirement. Besides that, discussions on quantitative measures of market risk and risk management 
activities by the companies were found to be inadequate. The findings from Roulstone (1999) are similar 
to Blankley et al. (2002) who investigated the market risk disclosure by the Dow 30 companies after the 
release of FRR No.48. 
A study was done by Clarkson et al. (1999) to investigate the role, if any, that MD&A plays in a 
Ĩŝƌŵ ?ƐĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞƉĂĐŬĂŐĞ ?dŚĞy found evidence of variability of disclosure quality across companies in 
the MD&A section, particularly for forward-looking information which varies directly with the upcoming 
firm performance (companies that expect firm performance to be positive tend to disclose better quality 
of risk information in the MD&A section). Another study done by Lajili and Zegnal (2005), examining the 
risk disclosure of TSE 300 Canadian companies, found that risk information disclosed in the notes to the 
financial statements and/or in the MD&A section emphasize down-side risks, in which financial risk with 
its four sub-categories (interest rate, currency, credit and financial instruments value), commodity and 
market risk categories were the most frequently cited risk categories. They indicated that risk 
disclosures by Canadian companies, in overall, are consistent with the Canadian Institute of Chartered 
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Accountants (CICA) Handbook and Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) requirements, which require the 
registrant firms to disclose risk associated with the use of financial and other instruments. They also 
found that risk information disclosed is mainly qualitative-based and therefore lacks quantitative 
insights.  
In Germany, the disclosure of risk information became mandated after the introduction of 
KonTraG (the Law on Corporate Control and Transparency) in year 1998. According to the legislation, 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ŶĞĞĚ ƚŽ ĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƐŬƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?Ɛ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĂŶŶƵĂů ŵĂŶĂgement 
commentary (Dobler, 2005b). However, the legal requirement did not state clearly the extent of risk 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ďĞ ĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ  ?ĞƌŐĞƌ ĂŶĚ 'ůĞŝɴŶĞƌ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ? dŚĞ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ ĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ
Standard Board (GASB) then issued two German Accounting Standards (GAS) to supplement the legal 
requireŵĞŶƚ ?dŚĞƐĞĂƌĞ'^EŽ ? ? “ƌŝƐŬƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ'^EŽ ? ? ? “ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ ? ?ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ
'ĞƌŵĂŶǇŝƐƵŶĚĞƌĂŵĂŶĚĂƚŽƌǇƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?ĞƌŐĞƌĂŶĚ'ůĞŝɴŶĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? )ĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨƌŝƐŬ
disclosure is still at a low level, drawing from a study on 92 German HDAX-listed companies. They also 
found that the financial risks were mostly reported and strategic risk the least reported risks. Besides 
that, few companies were found to have provided quantitative-based risk information.  
Linsley and Shrives (2006) examined the nature of risk disclosures in the annual reports for FTSE 
100 non-financial companies. The majority of the companies disclosed forward-looking risk information 
though the qualitative risk disclosures prevail. Overall, they found that the risk information dispersed 
throughout the annual reports implying the lack of coherence in risk reporting. Beretta and Bozzolan 
(2004) and Hill and Short (2009), on the other hand, found that listed companies tend to disclose risk 
information related to the past which contradicts the findings by Linsley and Shrives (2006). Abraham et 
al. (2007) also found little or no evidence of forward-looking information when investigating the 
business risk disclosures of 14 non-financial companies from the FTSE 100. They then indicated that the 
business risk disclosures from these companies are of poor quality which is similar with the evidence 
found by Leitner-Hanetseder (2011) when examining the information quality of risk reporting in 
Germany and Austria.  
Amran et al. (2009) found that the level of risk disclosure in Malaysian annual reports is very 
much less than Linsley and Shrives (2006) found in the UK as risk reporting is still at an infancy stage in 
Malaysia. Othman and Ameer (2009), on the other hand, examine the market risk disclosure of 
Malaysian companies in compliance with FRS132: Financial Instruments  W Disclosure and Presentation. 
Their findings were that most of the companies comply with FRS132 and the nature of disclosure 
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(quantitative and qualitative) depends on the type of hedging instrument used. For example, companies 
that reported on the hedging with forward contracts provided mainly quantitative disclosure.  
In summary, risk reporting disclosure is found to be lacking in clarity and transparency even 
though some of the countries had made the requirements for risk disclosure to be mandatory. In fact, it 
can be seen that most of the companies choose to disclose qualitative risk information rather than to 
quantify the risk in monetary terms and financial risk is found to be the most reported risk drawing from 
the literature mentioned above.  
4.2 Usefulness of Risk Disclosure 
There are several studies that examined the usefulness and benefits of risk information for its 
various stakeholders. Coles and Jones (2004) found that the information disclosed in the Management, 
Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section provides incremental explanatory power in future revenues, 
future earnings, and contemporaneous stock returns. Linsmeier et al. (2002) claimed that the market 
risk disclosures mandated by SEC Financial Reporting Release No. 48 (FRR No. 48) reduces the trading 
volume sensitivity to changes in foreign exchange rate, interest rate and commodity prices. Rajgopal 
(1999), on the other hand, provided evidence that the commodity price risk disclosures were useful 
indicators of oil and gas price sensitivity. Dobler (2005a), however, argued that risk information 
disclosed in the annual reports should be used with caution as managers may still withhold 
unfavourable information even in a mandatory risk reporting regime. 
Baumann and Nier (2004), Sundmacher (2006), Hirtle (2007) and Perignon and Smith (2008) 
examined the usefulness of risk information reported by banks. Baumann and Nier (2004) found that 
banks that disclose more risk information are associated with lower level of stock price volatility, hence, 
improve the cost of capital and stock-based executive compensation. Sundmacher (2006) examined the 
risk disclosures by international banks and he found evidence of inconsistency and vagueness of risk 
disclosures, hence, its usefulness is limited to the stakeholders in assessing the risk profile of a company. 
Hirtle (2007), on the other hand, investigated the association between the market risk disclosure and 
future risk and return. He found that the level of market risk disclosure was associated with lower risk 
and higher returns. This contradicts with the findings from Li (2006) who found a negative association 
between risk disclosure and future earnings and returns. Perignon and Smith (2008), on the other hand, 
found that quality of VaR disclosure did not improve over time even though there was an increasing 
amount of the level of VaR disclosure.  
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4.3 Determinants of Risk Disclosure 
 Many researchers studied the factors that influence the level of voluntary disclosure, non-
financial disclosure and environmental risk disclosure (Stanga, 1976; Hossain et al., 1995; Ahmed and 
Courtis, 1999; Robb et al. 2001; Vanstraelen et al., 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Alsaeed, 2006; Aljifri 
and Hussainey, 2007). However, there are only a few empirical studies that investigated the factors that 
influence the level of risk disclosure. Prior studies in this area were done by Troster (2005); Helbok and 
Wagner (2006), Linsley and Shrives (2006), Abraham and Cox (2007), Deumes and Knechel (2008), 
Amran et al. (2009), Hassan (2009), Vandemaele et al. (2009), Horing and Grundl (2011) and Leitner-
hanetseder (2011). These researchers examined the relationship between the level of risk disclosure and 
company size, industry type, level of risk, profitability, number of executive directors, foreign listing 
status and country of domiciled. Findings from the above studies will be discussed in section 5 for 
hypotheses development. 
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5. Hypotheses  
This paper analyses several firm characteristics that influence the level of risk disclosure for UK 
and Malaysia companies. The empirical relationships between level of risk disclosure and company size, 
industry, foreign listing status, country of domicile, level of risk and profitability will be tested. The 
justification for the development of hypotheses is set out below.  
5.1 Company size 
Size is included in most of the disclosure studies, either as a variable of interest or as a control 
variable (Amran et al., 2009). Many researchers found a positive relationship between corporate size 
and risk disclosure level (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Amran et al., 2009; 
Vandemaele et al., 2009; Horing and Grundl, 2011). Researchers have suggested several reasons for 
which corporate size is expected to be positively related with disclosure level. First, larger firms have 
more existing and prospective stakeholders hence these firms need to disclose more risk related 
information to cater the need from its various stakeholders (Stanga, 1976; Amran et al., 2009). Besides 
that, Stanga (1976) stated that larger companies may feel less threatened and fearful for disclosing 
more information that would reveal their strategies. In addition, larger companies are deemed to have 
better information systems than smaller companies and therefore marginal cost for additional risk 
disclosure is lower for larger companies (Hassan, 2009). Hassan (2009) suggested that larger companies 
account for more political sensitivity since these companies may have monopolistic power in the market. 
Therefore, larger companies may disclose more risk information to reduce political sensitivity.  
Therefore, the first hypothesis tested will be,  ܪଵ = There is a positive relationship between company size and level of risk disclosure. 
5.2 Industry Classification 
The second hypothesis is concerned with examining the association between the level of risk 
disclosures and the nature of the industry. Several studies have shown that the nature of industry is 
significant in influencing the disclosure level (Stanga, 1976; Robb et al. 2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; 
Amran et al., 2009; Hassan, 2009). It is suggested by Haniffa and Cooke (2005, Ɖ ? ? ? ? )ƚŚĂƚ “ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ
ƚĞŶĚ ƚŽ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ŝŶ ůŝŶĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƉĞĐƵůŝĂƌŝƚŝĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐ ? ? dŚĞǇ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ
explained that labour intensive industries will disclose more information on employees whereas 
chemical industries will report more environment information for which they need to account for. 
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Stange (1976), on the other hand, stated that the industry effect in disclosure is driven by the 
motivation to maintain annual reports that are similar in information content to those of its rivals so as 
it is comparable within an industry. As the information disclosed in the annual reports within each 
industry becomes more and more alike, the disclosure differences among companies in different 
industries become more apparent. Besides that, companies from different industries encounter 
different types of risk and also subjected to special regulations due to the nature of the industry, hence, 
it is expected to observe dispersion in the nature of risk disclosures among companies from different 
industries (Amran et al., 2009). However, Wallace et al. (1994), Alsaeed (2006) and Aljifri and Hussainey 
(2007) found that industry type was an insignificant factor in explaining the variability of the level of risk 
disclosure. Therefore, the second hypothesis to be tested will be, ܪଶ= There is an association between industry classification and risk disclosures. 
5.3 Foreign listing status  
Previous studies have shown that companies with a greater number of foreign listings are 
positively related to risk disclosure (Wallace et al., 1994; Abraham and Cox, 2007). Haniffa and Cooke 
(2005) indicated that companies that are listed on another foreign stock exchange may have to adhere 
to the listing requirements in that country, hence greater disclosure in the annual reports. Abraham and 
Cox (2007) found that UK firms with a US stock exchange listing will disclose more risk information in the 
UK annual report than those UK companies which do not listed on the US stock exchange. Although US 
reporting standards require UK firms to disclose additional risk information specific to the company or 
its industry and to reconcile their financial statements to US accounting standards, there is no legal 
obligation for UK companies to include this piece of additional risk information in their UK annual 
reports. Nevertheless, information made available to stakeholders in other exchange markets is 
expected not to be held back from the stakeholders in the UK, hence it is expected that multiple listings 
may lead to more risk disclosure (Abraham and Cox, 2007). Likewise, Hossain et al. (1994) found that 
Malaysian companies that listed on London Stock Exchange disclosed more information to the public 
than companies listed only on Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (currently named as Bursa Malaysia). 
Besides that, international companies are more willing to compete against the disclosure levels of highly 
transparent companies and to disclose more information to the public than they would in their home 
country in order to reduce the costs of risks and uncertainties with procurement of competitive 
resources (Zarzeski, 1996; Hope, 2003). Therefore, the third hypothesis to be tested is, 
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ܪଷ = Companies with a greater number of foreign listings disclose more risk information in the annual 
reports.  
5.4 Country of domicile 
Vanstraelen et al. (2003) found significant differences in the extent of voluntary nonfinancial 
disclosures across Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, explained by the cultural, legal setting and 
financial reporting differences among these three European countries. Zarzeski et al. (1996) and Hope 
(2003) found that legal origin and culture have an impact on firm disclosure. Horing and Grundl (2011), 
on the other hand, found that the degree of risk disclosure practices in annual report of European 
insurers depends on the cultural differences in accounting, regulatory and market practice. Although 
both the UK and Malaysian companies are subjected to similar reporting standards, Amran et al. (2008) 
found that the risk information reported by Malaysian companies is very much less than Linsley and 
Shrives (2006) found in the UK. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis to be tested is, ܪସ = UK companies disclose more risk information than Malaysian companies in the annual reports. 
5.5 Level of Risk 
The fifth hypothesis is concerned with the relationship between the extent of risk disclosure and 
the level of risk within a company. dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞ ƐĞǀĞƌĂůŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐŽĨĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ƌŝƐŬ, of which corporate 
leverage is the most common used of proxy for risk in many disclosure studies (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; 
Alsaeed, 2006; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Amran et 
al., 2009; Hassan, 2009). The stakeholder theory postulates that companies with higher risk will disclose 
more risk information in order to justify the causes of high risk and to explain how they are managing 
the risks (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Amran et al., 2009). In particular, creditors will demand for more 
information if the company is highly leveraged (Alsaeed, 2006). Hassan (2009), on the other hand, 
indicated that managers have a personal interest in disclosing more risk information as a signal of their 
capability in managing risk exposures of the companies. There are not many studies testing the 
relationship between risk disclosure and leverage ratio and the findings from the previous studies are 
mixed. Linsley and Shrives (2006), Abraham and Cox (2007) and Amran et al. (2009) found no association 
whilst Deumes and Knechel (2008) and Hassan (2009) found a positive relationship between leverage 
and corporate risk disclosure. Hence, the fifth hypothesis to be tested is, ܪହ = There is a positive association between corporate leverage and risk disclosure.  
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5.6 Profitability 
Previous studies have shown mixed results on the relationship between profitability and the 
extent of risk disclosure. Helbok and Wagner (2006), Vandemaele et al. (2009) and Horing and Grundl 
(2011) found that profitability is negatively associated with risk disclosure practices. When a company 
performed badly, shareholders will then perceive that the company is exposed to higher risk and 
therefore demand for more risk information (Horing and Grundl, 2011). Besides that, Vandemaele et al. 
(2009) indicated that the board may experienced an increased sense of urgency to figure out the risk 
drivers that drive the bad performance in order to enhance the value creation process of the company. 
Deumes and Knechel (2008), on the other hand, found a significant positive relationship between 
profitability and extent of disclosure on risk management and internal control. They further explained 
that profitable companies have more resources available to invest in reporting system. Nevertheless, 
there are researchers that found insignificant result for this profitability (Troster, 2005; Alsaeed, 2006). 
Hence, there are two forms of sixth hypothesis to be tested,  ܪହ௔ = There is a positive association between profitability and risk disclosure.  ܪହ௕ = There is a negative association between profitability and risk disclosure.  
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Table 1 shows a summary of the results on the six tested variables mentioned above from the 
prior researchers.  
Table 1. Summary of results from the prior researchers 
 Variable Significant results Insigificant results 
Corporate size Positive relationship Aljifri and Hussainey (2007) 
 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) Hassan (2009) 
 
Abraham and Cox (2007) 
 
 
Amran et al. (2009) 
 
 
Vandemaele et al. (2009) 
 
 
Horing and Grundl (2011) 
 
   Industry classification Stanga (1976) Wallace et al. (1994) 
 
Robb et al. (2001) Alsaeed (2006) 
 
Haniffa and Cooke (2005) Aljifri and Hussainey (2007) 
 
Amran et al. (2009) 
 
 
Hassan (2009) 
 
   Foreign listing status Positive relationship 
 
 
Hossain et al. (1994) 
 
 
Wallace et al. (1994) 
 
 
Zarzeski (1996) 
 
 
Ahmed and Courtis (1999) 
 
 
Robb et al. (2001) 
 
 
Vanstraelen et al. (2003) 
 
 
Haniffa and Cooke (2005) 
 
 
Abraham and Cox (2007) 
 
   Country of domicile Robb et al. (2001) 
 
 
Vanstraelen et al. (2003) 
 
   Level of risk Positive relationship Linsley and Shrives (2006) 
 
Deumes and Knechel (2008) Abraham and Cox (2007) 
 
Hassan (2009) Amran et al. (2009) 
   Profitability Positive relationship Troster (2005) 
 
Helbok and Wagner (2006) Alsaeed (2006) 
 
Negative relationship 
 
 
Vandemaele et al. (2009) 
 
 
Horing and Grundl (2011) 
   Deumes and Knechel (2008)   
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6. Research Methodology  
6.1 Sample and data 
Most of the empirical studies have been conducted on risk disclosure of non-financial 
companies are either country-specific or industry specific. Insofar, there are no prior studies that 
examine the cross-country risk disclosure studies and therefore it would be interesting to examine the 
variability of risk disclosure practices between UK and Malaysian companies who have different history 
and economy background despite their similarity in reporting standards. The sample companies chosen 
for this study comprises twenty Malaysian companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia and twenty UK 
companies listed on the LSE. Annual reports for the year 2010 of these forty companies were 
downloaded from the corporate websites respectively. Although there are other channels such as 
newspaper, interim reports and announcements to the Stock Exchange for which risk information can be 
obtained, the annual report of a company is seen as the chief disclosure vehicle in conveying important 
corporate information to the public (Marston and Shrives, 1991). In addition, Lang and Lundholm (1993) 
and Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) advocate that the annual report is still perceived as an important 
source of obtaining risk information in which they are being conveyed through narratives, figures, and 
sketches. Furthermore, it would be incoherent and practically difficult to collect risk information from 
other sources mentioned above (Hassan, 2009). This study focuses the entire annual report since risk 
information is spread throughout the reports (Horing and Grundl, 2011). In addition, only a single year 
of annual reports is being analyzed as this can  “eliminate potential confounding effects of changes in 
reporting standards or practices over time ? (Vanstraelen et al., 2003, p.259). Besides that, insurance and 
financial companies were excluded from the sample selection as these companies are subjected to 
different types of risk reporting (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Vandemaele et al., 2009). The annual reports 
were selected randomly from four industries: construction, technology, retailer and telecommunication. 
Refer to Appendix 1 for the list of companies selected for this study.  
6.2 Method of analysis 
Content analysis is used to analyze risk disclosure in this study. Krippendorff (2004, p.14) defines 
ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĂƐ “ĂƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞĨŽƌŵĂŬŝŶŐƌĞƉůŝĐĂďůĞĂŶĚǀĂůŝĚŝŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĨƌŽŵƚĞǆƚƐ ?ŽƌŽƚŚĞƌ
ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵůŵĂƚƚĞƌ )ƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƵƐĞ ? ? It is also the most widely used method in examining 
risk disclosure (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Amran et al., 2009; Vandemaele et al., 
2009; Horing and Grundl, 2011). Content analysis involves several methods for analyzing the annual 
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reports. These methods are referred to subjective analyst ratings, semi-objective textual analysis 
(readability studies, thematic content analysis, and linguistic analysis), and semi-objective disclosure 
index studies (Beattie et al., 2004). The semi-objective disclosure index is adopted for examining the 
annual reports in this study.  
6.2.1 Disclosure index study 
Disclosure index is a  “ƉĂƌƚŝĂů ĨŽƌŵ ŽĨ ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ŝƚĞŵƐ ƚŽ ďĞ ƐƚƵĚŝĞĚ ĂƌĞ
ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĞĚĞǆĂŶƚĞ ? ?ĞĂƚƚŝĞĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) ?Wallace and Naser (1995) claimed that the list of items 
that form the disclosure index differ from one study to another. They further indicated that there is no 
general theory for the inclusion of items in examining the level of risk disclosure and therefore the 
disclosure index is then constructed based on the information provided in the annual reports that are 
able of capturing the differences in the level of risk disclosure among companies. There are two major 
categories of disclosure that form the total disclosure index (TDI). These are referred to as disclosure on 
risk management information and disclosure on risk exposure information. Disclosure on risk 
management information captures how good is the management in revealing and reporting their 
strategies in minimizing and/or eliminating risks in the annual reports. On the contrary, disclosure on 
risk exposure information seeks to measure how good is the management in disclosing the risks that 
facing the company. Sub-indices for these two major categories are calculated, namely the risk 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?s index (RM_Index )ĂŶĚƌŝƐŬĞǆƉŽƐƵƌĞ ?s index (RE_Index). Having a breakdown of TDI into 
RM_Index and RE_Index provides further insights into how do these companies vary in the nature of 
disclosure even though both of the companies have the same TDI: one of the companies might have a 
higher RM_Index than its RE_Index while another company score higher for RE_Index than RM_Index. 
There are 15 disclosure items on risk management and 17 disclosure items on risk exposure. The items 
that form the self-constructed measure of TDI and its sub-indices (RM_Index and RE_Index) are listed as 
below, 
Disclosure items that forŵƚŚĞZŝƐŬDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ Index (RM_Index) 
1) Did the Board explain their risk appetite? 
2) Did the annual report have a section for explaining risk and risk management? 
3) Did the company refer to Enterprise Risk Management (ERM)? 
4) ŝĚƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞŝƚƐƌŝƐŬŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?
5) Did the company disclose whether it has a risk committee/board risk committee/executive risk 
committee? 
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6) Did the company identify changes it has made to its risk management system in 2010? 
7) Did the company disclose its KPIs and/or other risk factors? 
8) Did the company disclose its management of foreign exchange risk? 
9) Did the company disclose its management of interest rate risk? 
10) Did the company disclose its management of commodity risk? 
11) Did the company disclose its management of credit risk? 
12) Did the company disclose its management of liquidity risk? 
13) Did the company disclose its management of operational risk? 
14) Did the company disclose its management of legal, tax and regulatory risk? 
15) Did the company disclose its management of business, strategic and reputation risk? 
Disclosure items that fŽƌŵƚŚĞZŝƐŬǆƉŽƐƵƌĞ ?Ɛ Index (RE_Index) 
1) Did the company disclose future risk exposures? 
2) Did the company disclose whether it is exposed to foreign exchange risk? 
3) Did the company quantify its exposure to foreign exchange risk? 
4) Did the company disclose whether it is exposed to interest rate risk? 
5) Did the company quantify its exposure to interest rate risk? 
6) Did the company disclose whether it is exposed to commodity risk? 
7) Did the company quantify its exposure to commodity risk? 
8) Did the company disclose whether it is exposed to credit risk? 
9) Did the company quantify its exposure to credit risk? 
10) Did the company disclose whether it is exposed to liquidity risk? 
11) Did the company quantify its exposure to liquidity risk? 
12) Did the company disclose whether it is exposed to operational risk? 
13) Did the company quantify its exposure to operational risk? 
14) Did the company disclose whether it is exposed to legal, tax and regulatory risk? 
15) Did the company quantify its exposure to legal, tax and regulatory risk? 
16) Did the company disclose whether it is exposed to business, strategic and reputational risk? 
17) Did the company quantify its exposure to business, strategic and reputational risk? 
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There are two methods to construct the disclosure index: weighted index and unweighted index 
(Beattie et al., 2004). Unweighted index measures the presence and absence of an item where 1 is 
awarded for a disclosure item irrespective of the frequency and 0 is awarded if the item is not found in 
the annual report. Weighted index, on the other hand, requires the researchers to give a score for each 
of the disclosure items based on their views of the richness of item disclosed in the annual report. Naser 
and Nusaibeh (2003, p. 46) states tŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ǁĞŝŐŚƚĞĚ ŝŶĚĞǆ  “ƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐ ďŽƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ
importance of each disclosƵƌĞŝƚĞŵƚŚĂƚĨŽƌŵƐƚŚĞŝŶĚĞǆ ? ?Nevertheless, weighted index method suffers 
from the issue of subjectivity as the scores are awarded based on the judgment of the researchers 
(Beattie et al. 2004). Naser and Nuseibeh (2003) used both unweighted and weighted indices when 
examining the quality of information reported by companies in Saudi. They found that the results 
obtained from these two methods differ significantly from each other. This is contradicts with the 
findings of Robbins and Austin (1986) and Chow and Wong-Boren (1987), who found that their results 
did not differ significantly despite the methods used. 
For the purpose of this study, weighted index is used as the researcher believes that it reflects 
better in the extent of a particular disclosure item under examination. This is also the method that used 
by Robb et al. (2001) and Vanstraelen et al. (2003) when investigating the cross-country disclosure. A 
score of 0 is given when no risk information is disclosed, score of 1 is awarded when the companies 
disclose some risk information and score of 2 is awarded when the companies disclose the risk 
information extensively.  In addition, multiple references to the same piece of risk information is not 
awarded for more points (Botosan, 1997). 
RM_Index, RE_Index and TDI for company j are computed by the following formula: 
ܴܯ ?ܫ݊݀݁ݔ௝ ൌ  ෍ ܴܯܵܥܱܴܧ௝ ? ?ଵହ௜ୀଵ  
ܴܧ ?ܫ݊݀݁ݔ௝ ൌ  ෍ ܴܧܵܥܱܴܧ௝ ? ?ଵ଻௜ୀଵ  
ܶܦܫ௝ ൌ  ෍ ܴܯܵܥܱܴܧ௝ ൅ ܴܧܵܥܱܴܧ௝ ? ?ଷଶ௜ୀଵ  
Where ܴܯܵܥܱܴܧ௝ represents the total score for risk management disclosure by company j ܴܧܵܥܱܴܧ௝ represents the total score for risk exposure disclosure by company j 
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A company that has the maximum score of 2 for all the disclosure items in a category will have a 
maximum index equal to 1. For example, a company that scores 2 for all the disclosure items on risk 
management information and risk exposure information will therefore has an index of 1 for RM_Index, 
RE_Index and TDI. 
6.2.2 Reliability and Validity 
Horing and Grundl (2011) emphasized the issue of subjectivity involved when crafting the 
disclosure items and conducting the scoring. It is therefore imperative to ensure that the reliability and 
validity of the disclosure index studies is achieved (Marston and Shrives, 1991).  
There are three types of reliability identified by Krippendorff (1980): stability, accuracy and 
reproducibility. Milne and Alder (1999, p.239) refer stability as the  “ĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĂũƵĚŐĞƚŽĐŽĚĞĚĂƚĂƚŚĞ
ƐĂŵĞǁĂǇŽǀĞƌƚŝŵĞ ?. Weber (1985) suggested a number of reasons for which inconsistencies in coding 
may arise. These iŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ  “ĂŵďŝŐƵŝƚŝĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞĐŽĚŝŶŐ ƌƵůĞƐ ?ĂŵďŝŐƵŝƚŝĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƚĞǆƚ ? ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ
ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽĚĞƌ ?ŽƌƐŝŵƉůĞĞƌƌŽƌƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐƌĞĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞǁƌŽŶŐŶƵŵĞƌŝĐĐŽĚĞĨŽƌĂĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ? (Weber, 
1985, p.17).  Stability is argued to be the weakest form of reliability because it involves only one person 
in the coding process (Weber, 1985; Milne and Alder, 1999). Nevertheless, it is still imperative to assess 
the stability in attaining reliability of coding (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). This is done under a test-retest 
procedure where the same set of annual reports is again analyzed by the same coder after a period of 
time (Milne and Alder, 1999). To ensure stability is attained for this present study, three annual reports 
were selected randomly and analyzed once again. The results obtained is similar to the previous one, 
hence, stability is attained.  
Reproducibility, on the other hand, refers ƚŽƚŚĞ “ĚĞŐƌĞĞƚŽǁŚŝĐŚĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĐĂŶďĞƌĞƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚďǇ
different analysts working under carrying conditions, at different locations, or using different 
ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂůůǇĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚŵĞĂƐƵƌŝŶŐŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?<ƌŝƉƉĞŶĚŽƌĨĨ ?1980, p. 215). It is therefore a limitation 
for this present study as the coding process was carried out by one person. 
<ƌŝƉƉĞŶĚŽƌĨĨ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? )ĚĞĨŝŶĞƐĂĐĐƵƌĂĐǇĂƐ “ƚhe degree to which a process conforms to its 
ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ǇŝĞůĚƐ ǁŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚ ƚŽ ǇŝĞůĚ ?.  For this study, standard coding for text is not 
established, hence, the results obtained might not be accurate. Nevertheless, Weber (1985) argued 
standard coding procedures are seldom constructed by researchers and it is commonly used for training 
purposes. Linsley and Shrives (2006) further argued that the reliability test can minimize but not 
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eliminate the subjectivity in coding as the definition and interpretation of risk is viewed differently by 
different people.  
Marston and Shrives (1991, p. 198) stress that a dŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞŝŶĚĞǆŝƐĚĞĞŵĞĚƚŽďĞǀĂůŝĚŝĨ “ƚŚĞǇ
mean what the researchers intended ? ? /Ŷ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ make sure the disclosure items are meaningful in 
explaining the extent of risk disclosure for this study, the disclosure items are crafted based on the 
current risk reporting issues and was amended for several times so as the disclosure items are able to 
capture the differences in the level of risk disclosure among companies.  
6.3 Data analysis 
6.3.1 Development of Multiple Regression Model 
In order to compare the extent of risk disclosure in different currency setting, Ringgit Malaysia 
(RM) is converted to Great Britain Pounds (GBP), using the exchange rate as at 1 January 2010. Three 
variables need to be measured for hypotheses to be tested. These are size, leverage and profitability. 
Size is measured as the total sales (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Amran et al., 
2009). As a measure of the level of risk of a company, leverage ratio or debt to assets ratio is used as a 
proxy (Amran et al., 2009; Hassan, 2009). It is calculated as the ratio of total liabilities and total assets. 
Return on assets, which is defined as the ratio of net profit to the year ended book value of total assets 
is used as a proxy for profitability. The country effect and industry classification are captured by dummy 
variables. To measure the country effect, the dummy variable take value of 1 when it is referred to listed 
companies from UK and the value of 0 otherwise. As there are four industries included in this research 
study, three dummy variables are defined (TECH, RET, COMM) to capture the industry effect. Dummy 
variables take value of 1 if the company is from the respective industry and 0 otherwise. When the three 
dummy variables take the value of 0, this simply implies that the company is from the construction field. 
Number of foreign listing of the companies is found from their corporate websites respectively.  
Multiple regression is employed in examining the firm characteristics that influence the elvel of 
risk disclosure in this study. Many researchers used this method in their studies (Amran et al., 2009; 
Hassan, 2009; Vandemaele et al., 2009; Horing and Grundl, 2011). The multiple regression model for this 
study is developed as below,  ܶܦܫ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܵܫܼܧ ൅ ߚଶܶܧܥܪ ൅ ߚଷܴܧܶ ൅ ߚସܥܱܯܯ ൅ ߚହܮܫܵܶܫܰܩ ൅ ߚ଺ܥܱܷܴܻܰܶ ൅ ߚ଻ܴܫܵܭ൅ ߚ଼ܴܱܲܨܫܶ ൅ ߝ 
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tŚĞƌĞ ɲ ? ŝŶƚĞƌĐĞƉƚ ? ^/E, corporate size; TECH, technology companies; RET, retailer; COMM, 
telecommunication companies; LISTING, foreign listing status; COUNTRY, country of domicile; 
RISK, level of risk; PROFIT, profitability of company; ߝ, error term. 
 
6.3.2 Assessing the validity of the model 
Before testing the above regression model, several tests were conducted to ensure that the 
multiple regression assumptions are not violated. Shapiro-Wilk test is applied to detect if the 
assumption of normality is violated. It is found that SIZE and PROFIT are not normally distributed. Both 
of the variables are then transformed into another functional form, namely the logarithm, to ensure the 
assumption of normality holds. For the detection of whether linearity assumption is being violated, 
quantile-quantile plots (QQ plots) are reviewed. The data set fall on the predicted line, indicated that 
the assumption of linearity is not violated (Dowd, 2005). In addition, the assumption of 
homoscedasticity is checked using the Breusch-Pagan test and it is found not to be violated since the p-
value is more than 5% level of significance (refer to table 3). It is also imperative to review the variance-
inflating factors (VIFs) and correlation coefficient to check whether the problem of multicollinearity 
exists (Hassan, 2009; Horing and Grundl, 2011). Multicollinearity exists when two or more independent 
variables are correlated to each other which then potentially dampen the predictability of the regression 
model (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). Table 4 and 5 shows the correlation matrix and VIFs, respectively. 
dŚĞ ĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ŵĂƚƌŝǆ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐ  “ĂŶ ŝĚĞĂ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŽƌǇ ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐ ?  ?,ĂƐƐĂŶ ?
2009, p. 677). The correlation coefficients have a minimum value of -1, indicate both the variables are 
perfectly negatively correlated (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). A maximum value of +1, on the other hand, 
indicates perfect positive correlation. s/& ?ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ ŚĂŶĚ ? ƐŚŽǁƐ ƚŚĞ  “ƐƉĞĞĚ ǁŝƚŚǁŚŝĐŚǀĂƌŝĂŶĐĞƐ
Table 2. Summary Regression Variables     
Variables Acronym Measurement 
Total disclosure index TDI Total score of a company for the self-constructed disclosure  
  
Items divided by the maximum score (refer to section 6.2.1) 
Corporate size SIZE Total sales 
Industry classification: Technology TECH Dummy variable take value of 1 if the company is from the 
                                          Retailer RET respective industry and 0 otherwise 
                                          Telecommunication COMM 
 Foreign listing status LISTING Number of listing on foreign stock exchanges 
Country of domicile COUNTRY Dummy variable take value of 1 if the company is from UK  
  
and 0 otherwise 
Level of risk RISK Debt to assets ratio (total liabilities divided by total assets) 
Profitability PROFIT Return on assets ratio (net profit divided by book value of  
    total assets) 
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ĂŶĚ ĐŽǀĂƌŝĂŶĐĞƐ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ ?  ?'ƵũĂƌĂƚŝ ?  ? ? ? ?, p. 328). There is no standard cut-off point for which the 
correlation coefficients ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐ ?VIFs should be to benchmark the non-existence 
of multicollinearity. However, there is a general rule for which multicollinearity is implied to exist, it is 
when the correlation coefficient is greater than 0.7 and the VIF is greater than 10 at the same time 
(Horing and Grundl, 2011). When both of the criteria are met, one can claim that the likelihood of 
multicollinearity problem in the sample data. Table 4 shows the correlation coefficient between the 
independent variables are between -0.454 and +0.692 and table 5 shows that the highest VIF is 2.831. 
This evident that the issue of multicollinearity is not a concern for our data set. 
 
Table 3. Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroscedasticity   
Sample size 40 
 Number of predictors 8 
 P-value 0.8500   
 
Notes: * and ** correlation is significant at the 10% and 5%, respectively. 
 
 
Table 4. Correlation matrix                
  TDI SIZE TECH RET COMM LISTING COUNTRY RISK PROFIT 
TDI 1.000 
        SIZE 0.618** 1.000 
       TECH -0.171 -0.454** 1.000 
      RET -0.206 0.140 -0.333* 1.000 
     COMM 0.410** 0.181 -0.333* -0.333* 1.000 
    LISTING 0.499** 0.173 -0.044 -0.218 0.480** 1.000 
   COUNTRY 0.422** 0.226   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.076 1.000 
  RISK 0.531** 0.692** -0.398* 0.189 0.125 0.037 0.306 1.000 
 PROFIT 0.290 0.323 -0.193 0.407* 0.214 0.108 0.026 0.504** 1.000 
Table 5. Variance inflation factors (VIFs)    
Variable                                                                                                                              VIF   
SIZE 1.961 
 TECH 1.942 
 RET 2.004 
 COMM 2.126 
 LISTING 1.705 
 COUNTRY 1.640 
 RISK  2.831 
 PROFIT 2.212   
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7. Empirical Results and Discussion 
7.1 Overall Practices 
7.1.1 Financial and non-financial risk disclosures   
As mentioned in section 2.2, risks are grouped into financial risk and non-financial risk. Financial 
risk consists of market risk (foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, and commodity risk), credit risk and 
liquidity risk while operational risk, tax and regulatory risk and business, strategic and reputation risk 
represent the non-financial risk. This section analyzes the nature and extent of the disclosure of the 
above mentioned risk categories. 
Figure 3 presents the extent of disclosure on financial against non-financial risk information in 
the annual report of the sample companies. Average percentage score is calculated as the percentage of 
the maximum score the companies could achieve on the relevant disclosure items on average. It is used 
as a measure of the extent of risk disclosure instead of TDI as TDI measures the risk disclosure from 
various aspects (it includes disclosure items that measure the future risk information and other risk 
information). In order to focus on the financial and non-financial risk disclosure, the following disclosure 
items are extracted and examined solely, 
Financial risk disclosures 
1) Did the company disclose whether it is exposed to foreign exchange risk? 
2) Did the company quantify its exposure to foreign exchange risk? 
3) Did the company disclose its management of foreign exchange risk? 
4) Did the company disclose whether it is exposed to interest rate risk? 
5) Did the company quantify its exposure to interest rate risk? 
6) Did the company disclose its management to interest rate risk? 
7) Did the company disclose whether it is exposed to commodity risk? 
8) Did the company quantify its exposure to commodity risk? 
9) Did the company disclose its management to commodity risk? 
10) Did the company disclose whether it is exposed credit risk? 
11) Did the company quantify its exposure to credit risk? 
12) Did the company disclose its management to credit risk? 
13) Did the company disclose whether it is exposed to liquidity risk? 
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14) Did the company quantify its exposure to liquidity risk? 
15) Did the company quantify its management to liquidity risk? 
Non-financial risk disclosures 
1) Did the company disclose whether it is exposed to operational risk? 
2) Did the company quantify its exposure to operational risk? 
3) Did the company disclose its management to operational risk? 
4) Did the company disclose whether it is exposed to legal, tax and regulatory risk? 
5) Did the company quantify its exposure to legal, tax and regulatory risk? 
6) Did the company disclose its management of legal, tax and regulatory risk? 
7) Did the company disclose whether it is exposed to business, strategic and reputational risk? 
8) Did the company quantify its exposure to business, strategic and reputational risk? 
9) Did the company disclose its management of business, strategic and reputation risk? 
Figure 3 shows that the sample companies in this study disclosed more about financial risk 
compared to non-financial risk. The average percentage score for financial risk is 49.7% while the 
average percentage score for non-financial risk is 30.6%. Although the average percentage score for 
financial risk is higher than non-financial risk, the disclosure of financial risk information is still relatively 
low. The sample companies score only half of the maximum score (100%). Figure 4 further examines the 
disclosure of financial risk and non-financial between the UK and Malaysian companies. UK companies 
have a higher percentage scores than Malaysian companies, on average, in both financial risk and non-
financial risk. Comparing the percentage scores from both Figure 3 and 4, UK companies score more 
than the aggregate percentage scores (which calculated based on scores from UK and Malaysian 
companies) in both financial and non-financial risks.  UK companies, however, still disclose more 
information in financial risk compare to non-financial risk. Nevertheless, the difference in percentage 
score is no longer very significant. Malaysian companies, on the other hand, score less than the 
aggregate percentage scores in both financial and non-financial risks. Besides that, the difference 
between the disclosure of financial risk and non-financial risk is very much significant compare to UK 
companies. Malaysian companies have an average percentage score of 46.3% in financial risk and only 
19.4% in non-financial risk.  
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Figure 3. Disclosure of financial risk against non-financial risk 
 
Figure 4. Disclosure of financial risk against non-financial risk for both countries 
 
In order to provide further insight into the extent of disclosure for each of the risk component 
under financial risk and non-financial risk, figure 5 presents the results. From the table, figure 5 shows 
that most of the UK companies reported risk information related to foreign exchange risk (68.3%), 
interest rate risk (64.2%) and credit risk (64.2%). In general, UK companies have relatively high 
percentage scores for all the risk groups except for commodity risk (6.7%) and legal, tax and regulatory 
risk (20.8%). 
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Malaysian companies, on the other hand, disclosed most of the risk information related to 
interest rate (66.7%). Overall, Malaysian companies reported less risk information for all the risk groups 
compared to UK companies except for interest rate risk. Nevertheless, the difference between the 
percentage scores for interest rate risk between UK and Malaysian companies is minimal. The 
percentage scores for UK companies and Malaysian companies are 64.2% and 66.7%, showing a 
difference of only 2.5%. UK companies, on the other hand, disclosed more risk information in almost all 
the risk group where significant differences can be found in operational risk and legal, tax and regulatory 
risk. UK companies disclosed more than double in operating risk compared to Malaysian companies and 
approximately double in risk information related to legal, tax and regulatory risk. 
Figure 5. A comparison of disclosure of risk group between UK and Malaysian companies 
 
Figure 6 and 7 further disaggregate the information provided in figure 5. As mentioned earlier 
that the disclosure index made up of two categories, namely the disclosure on risk management 
information and disclosure on risk exposures information. It provides meaningful insights to separate 
the analysis for both the percentage scores of disclosure on risk management information and risk 
exposures information. Figure 6 shows that the highest percentage score for disclosing risk information 
related to the management of risk is from the reporting of business, strategic and reputational risk by 
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UK companies (75.0%) and the lowest percentage score is on disclosure of risk management in 
commodity risk (5%).  
Malaysian companies, on the other hand, disclosed most in their annual reports the risk 
management of credit risk (60.0%) and none of them disclose their management of commodity risk (0%). 
Again, a big difference in disclosing risk management information on operational risk is found where UK 
companies score 60% and Malaysian companies score 20%. Besides that, a relatively big difference is 
found between UK and Malaysian companies in disclosing management of business, strategic and 
reputational risk where UK companies score 75.0% and Malaysian companies score 42.5%. Looking at 
the percentage scores of disclosing risk exposures (refer to figure 7), both companies from UK and 
Malaysian score high in foreign exchange risk, liquidity risk and credit risk.  
In summary, UK and Malaysian companies disclosed most of their risk information related to 
financial risk compared to non-financial risk in the annual reports. This is because both the IASB and 
MASB have issued standards related to the measurement, presentation and recognition of the financial 
instruments, which require the listed companies to adhere to. This is similar with the results found by 
Lajili and Zegnal (2005) who indicated that Canadian companies emphasize on reporting financial risk as 
required by CICA Handbook and TSX requirements. The results from this study further suggest the 
importance of accounting standard setters in playing a role for a better risk reporting regime. Although 
the level of financial risk disclosures, in overall, is not relatively high, a mandatory risk reporting regime 
is still deemed to be crucial in moving towards a more transparent risk disclosures in the annual report. 
When the total percentage scores were disaggregate into Malaysia and UK, UK companies are found to 
disclose more risk information than Malaysian companies, in overall, for both risk management and risk 
exposure disclosures. This is explained by Amran et al. (2009) that risk reporting in Malaysian is still at an 
infancy stage. For example, Malaysian companies started to adopt FRS 132: Financial Instruments  W 
Disclosure and Presentation (which is identical to IAS 32) from year 2006 onwards even though IAS 32 
had been issued in year 1996.  
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Figure 6. A comparison of disclosure on risk management between UK and Malaysian companies 
 
Figure 7. A comparison of disclosure on risk exposure between UK and Malaysian companies 
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7.1.2 Monetary risk disclosures 
It is imperative for ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐƚŽƋƵĂŶƚŝĨǇƚŚĞŝƌƌŝƐŬĞǆƉŽƐƵƌĞĂƐ “ĂŵŽŶĞƚĂƌǇǀĂůƵĞƵƉŽŶĂƌŝƐŬ
enables the reader to assess its potential impact upon the company ? ?>ŝŶƐůĞǇĂŶĚ^ŚƌŝǀĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) ?
Figure 8 shows the number of UK and Malaysian companies that quantify their risk exposures for each 
risk group, respectively. Again, the relevant disclosure items are extracted to examine the extent of 
monetary risk disclosure and these items are presented as below, 
1) Did the company quantify its exposure to foreign exchange risk? 
2) Did the company quantify its exposure to interest rate risk? 
3) Did the company quantify its exposure to commodity risk? 
4) Did the company quantify its exposure to credit risk? 
5) Did the company quantify its exposure to liquidity risk? 
6) Did the company quantify its exposure to operational risk? 
7) Did the company quantify its exposure to legal, tax and regulatory risk? 
8) Did the company quantify its exposure to business, strategic and reputational risk? 
Figure 8 shows the number of UK and Malaysian companies that quantify their risk exposures 
for each risk group. Most of the UK and Malaysian companies quantify the financial risk exposures 
compared to non-financial risk exposures. During the process of scoring the disclosure items, the 
researcher observed that most of the companies used sensitivity analysis to quantify the financial risk 
exposure. For example, Vodafone Group Plc which scored a maximum of 2 for quantifying the foreign 
exchange risk exposure, stated in their annual report that, 
 “At 31 March 2010 120% of net debt was denominated in currencies other than sterling (49% euro, 46% 
US dollar and 25% other) while 20% of net debt been purchased forward in sterling in anticipation of 
ƐƚĞƌůŝŶŐ ĚĞŶŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚ ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ƌĞƚƵƌŶƐ ǀŝĂ ĚŝǀŝĚĞŶĚƐ ? ? ? ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇ ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶŝŶŐ ŝn the value of 
sterling against certain currencies in which the Group maintains cash and cash equivalents has resulted 
in a reduction in cash and cash equivalents of £257 million from currency translation differences in the 
year ended 31 March 2010 (2009: £371 million increase).... ? ? ? ?A? ? ?A?Žƌ ? ?A? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?A? ? ? ?A?Žƌ ? ?A? ?
ĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Žƌh^ ? ? ?ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞƌĂƚĞƐǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞĂ ? ? ? ?ŵŝůůŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ?ŵŝůůŝŽŶŽƌ ? ? ? ?ŵŝůůŝŽŶ
(2009: £164 million, £136 million and £496 million) impact on profit or loss in relation to these financial 
instruments ? (Vodafone Group Plc, annual report 2010, p. 106) 
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The difficulty in quantifying non-financial risk exposure might be the possible explanation for 
which only few companies that quantify the operational, legal, tax and regulatory and business, strategic 
and reputational risks. Moreover, the breakthroughs in the mathematics for measuring financial risks, 
ďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ ,ĂƌƌǇ DĂƌŬŽǁŝƚǌ ?Ɛ ŵĞĂŶ-variance theory of portfolio selection, followed by the 
development of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) in measuring risk of a security, the valuation of 
option pricing using the Black-Scholes model and the computation of VaR for measuring the likelihood of 
losses of a given portfolio provide multiple measurement tools for which a company can adopt to 
quantify their financial risk exposures (Dowd, 2005; Simkins and Ramirez, 2008). Figure 9, on the other 
hand, shows the extent of these companies in disclosing monetary risk information in the annual report. 
The results show that both the UK and Malaysian companies provide in depth disclosure of monetary 
risk information on financial risk. 
In summary, most of the companies quantify financial risk exposures rather than non-financial 
risk exposure and sensitivity analysis is often used to measure the impact of the respective financial risk 
on the profit or loss of the company. 
Figure 8. Number of companies that disclose monetary risk information 
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Figure 9. Extent of disclosure of monetary risk information 
 
7.1.3 Forward-looking risk disclosures 
Figure 10 presents the number of companies that disclosed forward-looking risk information in 
their annual report while figure 11 presents the extent of disclosure of forward-looking risk information 
in the annual reports. Overall, UK companies are well-prepared to report to the future risk exposures to 
their stakeholders. There are more than half of the UK sample companies that disclose the forward-
looking risk information and these companies have a relatively high percentage score, on average, for 
disclosing forward-looking risk information (78.6%). This is consistent with the findings of Linsley and 
Shrives (2006) who found that majority of the companies disclosed forward-looking risk information. For 
example, Next Plc, a UK retailer, scored the maximum of 2, stated in their annual report that, 
 “dŚĞƉĂǇďĂĐŬŽŶŶĞƚĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝŶǀĞƐƚĞĚŝŶŶĞǁƐƉĂĐĞŝƐĨŽƌĞĐĂƐƚƚŽďĞ ? ?ŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?dŚĞŶĞƚƐƚŽƌĞĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ
is forecast to be 21%......Three years ago we started a programme to reinvigorate the look and feel of our 
stores, the vast majority of which are now in keeping with our brand. We expect that a capital 
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚŽĨ ? ? ?ŵƉĞƌĂŶŶƵŵǁŝůůďĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƚŚĞŝŵĂŐĞŽĨŽƵƌƐƚŽƌĞƐ ? ?(Next Plc, annual 
report 2010, p. 6) 
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 “E^>ĨĂĐĞƐĂĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐǇĞĂƌǁŝƚŚĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůƐƵƉƉůŝĞƌƐĂŶĚ general pressure 
on supplier margins. As a result of these pressures we expect NSL to report profits in the region of £30m 
ĨŽƌƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚǇĞĂƌ ?(Next Plc, annual report 2010, p. 9) 
Malaysian companies, on the other hand, still lack transparency in disclosing forward looking 
risk information. Fewer than half of the sample companies from Malaysia disclosed forward-looking risk 
information and for those that disclosed it, account for an average percentage score of 50%. For 
example, BRDB, a Malaysian construction companies, scored 1 for disclosing future risk information, 
stated in their annual report that,  
 “ĂƉ^ƋƵĂƌĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞ<>ŵŝĚƚŽǁŶĂƌĞĂ ?ŝƐƐƚŝůůƐƚƌƵŐŐůŝŶŐƚŽĨŝŶĚŝƚƐŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂŶĚŽŶĞŽĨŽƵƌƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐŝŶ ? ? ?
will be to redefine the mall and step up efforts to drive traffic beyond the office catchment in the area ? 
(BRDB, annual report 2010, p. 20) 
In summary, UK companies have higher percentage scores for disclosing forward-looking risk 
information compared to Malaysian companies. Nevertheless, Malaysian companies have a fairly high 
percentage scores for disclosing future risk in the annual reports. This is in line with the findings 
obtained by Linsley and Shrives (2006) who indicated that companies did exhibit a willingness to disclose 
their future risk information to its stakeholders. It is therefore expected to observe an increasing 
number of companies in disclosing future risk information as well as the extent of disclosure in the 
future. 
Figure 10. Number of companies that disclose forward-looking risk information 
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Figure 11. Extent of disclosure of forward-looking risk information
 
 
7.1.4 Corporate Governance disclosures 
Figure 12 presents the number of companies that disclosed in their annual reports the 
respective corporate governance information and figure 13 presents the extent of disclosure for each 
disclosure items. There are four disclosure items that examine the disclosure of corporate governance 
information. These disclosure items are presented as below,   
1) Did the board explain their risk appetite? 
2) Did the annual report have a section for explaining risk and risk management? 
3) Did the company refer to Enterprise Risk Management? 
4) Did the company disclose whether it has a risk committee/board risk committee/executive risk 
committee? 
There are only four UK companies that disclosed in their annual reports their risk appetite. 
These are Galliford Try Plc, BT Group Plc, Vodafone Group Plc and Inmarsat Plc. These companies, on 
average, scored half for this item and therefore the percentage score shown is 50%. On the other hand, 
none of the Malaysian companies in the sample size reveal their risk appetite to the public. BT Group, a 
telecommunication company in the UK, scored 1 for the disclosure item related to explaining risk 
appetite, stated in their annual report that, 
  “dŚĞŐƌŽƵƉŚĂƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚďĞĂƌŝŶŐĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĂƐƐĞƚƐĂŶĚĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůůŝĂďŝůities which may expose the group to 
ĞŝƚŚĞƌĐĂƐŚĨůŽǁŽƌĨĂŝƌǀĂůƵĞǀŽůĂƚŝůŝƚǇ ?dŚĞŐƌŽƵƉ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ĂƐƉƌĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚďǇƚŚĞŽĂƌĚ ?ŝƐƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚ
ůĞĂƐƚ ? ?A?ŽĨŶĞƚĚĞďƚŝƐĂƚĨŝǆĞĚƌĂƚĞƐ ? (BT Group, annual report 2010, p. 137) 
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Most of the UK and Malaysian companies have a specific section for explaining risk and risk 
management related information. Almost all the UK companies, except for Transense Technologies Plc,   
disclosed their principal risks and uncertainties and actions taken to mitigate the risks in a particular 
section. This is because the UK ŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐĐƚ  ? ? ? ?ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐĂĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ ?ƐƌĞƉŽƌƚ ƚŽďĞ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
ĂŶŶƵĂůƌĞƉŽƌƚĂŶĚƚŚŝƐŵƵƐƚĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĂďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐƌĞǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ?tŽŽĚƐĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ) ?
The business review must include a ĨĂŝƌƌĞǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĂŶĚĂĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂů
risks and uncertainties facing the company. Furthermore, the findings from a survey set out by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) in year 2007, found that 75% of the companies surveyed clearly 
disclosed their principal risks and 57% of the companies that disclosed some risk information also 
provided information on how to manage those risks. Malaysian companies, on the other hand, disclose 
most of the risk information in the statement of internal control as required by the Listing Requirements 
of Bursa Malaysia. 
There are only few UK and Malaysian companies that disclosed whether they are implementing 
ERM and the existence of a risk committee in governing the risk management system. As mentioned by 
Simkins and Ramirez (2008), the difficulty involved in implementing ERM and the need for more 
information to establish a proper ERM system often deter the companies from doing it. Chapman (2006, 
p.221) ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ  “ĂďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ĐĂŶŶŽƚĐůĂŝŵ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚŚĂƐan enterprise risk management process if it 
ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƌŝƐŬ ?. Assuming a positive association between operational risk 
management and the willingness of company to disclose it in the annual report, Malaysian companies 
should have disclosed more on operational risk than UK companies since the number of Malaysian 
companies that implement ERM is higher. However, as mentioned earlier, that UK companies disclosed 
more than Malaysian companies on operational risk. This further evident that Malaysian companies lack 
transparency in risk reporting. Figure 13, on the other hand, shows that both UK and Malaysian 
companies that disclosed these information have fairly high percentage scores. In particular, Malaysian 
companies have the higher percentage scores compared to UK companies in disclosing the risk 
information related to the implementation of ERM and the role of risk committee. It is quite interesting 
to observe that Malaysian companies disclosed ERM and risk committee related information more in 
depth compared to UK companies and yet have lower percentage scores for almost all the risk groups, 
as mentioned in the previous sections, compared to UK companies. The reasons that drive the attitude 
of Malaysian companies towards this risk reporting style is unclear and therefore it remains as a puzzle 
for this study. Future researchers can further investigate in this area.   
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Figure 12. Number of companies that disclosed the respective corporate governance information 
 
 
Figure 13. Extent of risk disclosure for each disclosure items 
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7.2 Multiple Regression Analysis 
7.2.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable (TDI) and its sub-indices 
(RM_Index and RE_Index). As mentioned earlier that the maximum index for which a company can score 
is 1 and the minimum index is 0 for all TDI, RM_Index and RE_Index, respectively. Mean for RE_Index 
(0.4316) is higher than RM_Index (0.3300) whilst the mean for TDI is 0.3840. The standard deviations for 
TDI, RM_Index and RE_Index are 0.1586, 0.1718 and 0.1729, which is very low, indicatinŐƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ?
scores for these indices do not dispersed by much from their mean scores.  
Table 6. Descriptive statistics for dependant variables (TDI, RM_Index, and RE_Index) 
Variables N Min Max Mean    Sum Standard Deviation 
TDI 40 0.0938 0.7813 0.3840 15.3594 0.1586 
RM_Index 40 0.1000 0.8000 0.3300 13.2000 0.1718 
RE_Index 40 0.0882 0.7641 0.4316 17.2637 0.1729 
 
As reported in table 6 that the mean of RE_Index is higher than the mean of RM_Index, 
indicating that companies disclose more on risk exposures or risk management information in the 
annual report. In order to figure out whether the relationship mentioned above is statistically significant, 
one-tailed paired sample t test is carried out. Table 7 presents the results obtained from the test. 
Looking at the p-value (0.0000), it can be concluded that the mean of RM_Index and RE_Index differ 
from each other significantly of which the mean of RE_Index is higher than the mean of RM_Index. As 
reported in table 7, the mean difference between RM_Index and RE_Index is 0.1016. This simply implies 
that the sample companies score higher in risk exposure disclosure index (RE_Index) compare to risk 
management disclosure index (RM_Index) by 0.0611 index point on average.  
Table 7. Results from the Pair Samples t Test     
Descriptive Values   
Mean difference (RM_Index - RE_Index) -0.1016 
 Standard deviation 0.1345 
 T-statistic -4.7802 
 Degree of freedom 39.0000 
 P-value (2-tailed) 0.0000***   
Note: *** indicates significant at 1%. 
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Table 8 and 9 shows the descriptive statistics for independent non-binary variables (SIZE, 
LISTING, RISK, PROFIT) and independent binary variables (TECH, RET, COMM, COUNTRY). Overall, the 
standard deviations are quite low except for SIZE. This shows that the variation of the corporate size of 
the chosen listed companies for this research study is relatively large.  
 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics for independent non-binary variables   
Variable N Min Max Sum Mean  Standard Deviation 
SIZE 40 5.2082 10.6481 330.1192 8.2530 1.1366 
LISTING 40 0.0000 1.0000 5.0000 1.1250 0.3349 
RISK 40 0.0381 1.0916 18.8372 0.4709 0.2286 
PROFIT 40 -2.9404 0.4359 -33.4422 -0.9836 0.5866 
 
Table 9. Descriptive statistics for independent binary variables     
Variable N Min Max Sum Mean Standard Deviation 
TECH 40 0 1 10 0.2500 0.4385 
RET 40 0 1 10 0.2500 0.4385 
COMM 40 0 1 10 0.2500 0.4385 
COUNTRY 40 0 1 20 0.5000 0.5064 
 
 
7.2.2 Multiple Regression results 
Table 10 shows the multiple regression results. F-statistic has a p-value of 0.000 which is 
statistically significant at 1%, indicating that at least one of the independent variable is explaining the 
extent of risk disclosure. Discussion for which of the independent variable is found to be statistically 
significant in influencing the level of risk disclosure will be explained below. The model adjusted R² 
(0.570) indicates that the independent variables explain 57% of the variation in TDI. These imply that the 
model established is not a weak one, if not robust. The multiple regression model is then run again with 
the same set of independent variables against the RM_Index and RE_index, respectively. The results 
obtained show minimal variation from the multiple regression results using TDI as the dependent 
variable. Notwithstanding, the adjusted R-squared are lower than 57%. Therefore, the further discussion 
will then based on the multiple regression results using TDI as the dependent variable. 
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Table 10. Multiple Regression Results     
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient  P-value 
Constant 
 
                  -0.215 0.379 
SIZE + 0.047 0.065* 
TECH +/- 0.012 0.840 
RET +/- -0.075 0.202 
COMM +/- 0.077 0.245 
LISTING + 0.126 0.094* 
COUNTRY + 0.104 0.032** 
RISK + 0.115 0.437 
PROFIT +/- 0.034 0.462 
    F-statistic 
  
0.000*** 
Adjusted R²     0.570 
Notes: * indicates significant at 10%; ** indicates significant at 5%; *** indicates significant at 1%. 
 
Corporate size, measured as the logarithm of total sales, is positive and statistically significant at 
10%. Accordingly, the empirical findings support the first hypothesis (ܪଵ). This implies that larger 
companies disclose more risk information in the annual reports as they need to accommodate the need 
for larger pool of stakeholders. Besides that, larger companies are able to exploit for a lower marginal 
costs for additional risk information to be reported. This result is consistent with the findings of prior 
literature (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Amran et al., 2009; Vandemaele et al., 
2009; Horing and Grundl, 2011).   
 The second hypothesis tests whether the nature of industry contribute to different level of risk 
disclosures in the annual report. The results show that industry effect is insignificant in explaining the 
TDI, therefore rejecting the second hypothesis (ܪଶ). This is in line with the findings of Wallace et al. 
(1994), Alsaeed (2006) and Aljifri and Hussainey (2007). The possible explanation for an insignificant 
association between industry classification and level of risk disclosure is that companies from UK and 
Malaysia are subjected to different domestic regulations even though that both the companies are from 
the same industry field and subjected to similar reporting standards.   
The third hypothesis tests whether the number of foreign listing is significant in explaining the 
level of risk disclosures in the annual reports. There are three companies that listed on foreign stock 
exchange. These companies are ARM Holdings Plc, BT Group Plc and Vodafone Group Plc from the UK. 
ARM Holdings Plc and Vodafone Group Plc listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange while BT Group Plc 
listed on NYSE stock exchange. The coefficient of LISTING is positive and significant at a 10%, supporting 
the third hypothesis (ܪଷ). This implies that these three companies that listed on the US stock exchange 
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disclosed more risk information in their annual reports by 0.126, on average, measured in TDI. This is in 
line with the result of Abraham and Cox (2007) who found a positive relationship between UK 
companies that dual list in the US and the level of risk disclosure in the UK annual report as SEC listing 
rules requires UK companies that dual list in the US to report additional risk disclosure specific to the 
company or its industry.  
Country effect is found to be statistically significant at 5%, supporting the fourth hypothesis ሺܪସሻǤThe positive coefficient (0.104) suggests that UK listed companies in the sample, on average, 
scored 0.104 more in TDI compared to Malaysian listed companies.  This is consistent with the findings 
of Amran et al. (2009) who found that Malaysian listed companies reported very much less risk 
information in the annual reports compared to UK companies as risk reporting is still at the infancy stage 
in Malaysia. To further investigate the variation of disclosure index for both of the country, independent 
sample t tests are carried out for RM_Index and RE_Index, respectively. Table 11 presents the results 
from the test for RM_Index. From the table, it can be seen that UK companies have a higher mean for 
RM_Index than Malaysian companies. The p-value (0.0211) for this test is significant at 5%, concluding 
that UK companies disclosed more than Malaysia companies in risk information related to risk 
management in the annual reports. Table 12, on the other hand, presents the results from the test for 
RE_Index. Similar to the findings for RM_Index, UK companies have a higher mean score for RE_Index 
compare to Malaysian companies. The p-value (0.0086) is significant at 1%, indicating that UK 
companies disclosed more than Malaysian companies in risk information related to risk exposure in the 
annual reports. In summary, UK companies are more transparent than Malaysian companies in reporting 
risk information, for both risk management and risk exposure, consistent with the findings discussed in 
section 7.1.  Furthermore, this result further supports the second hypothesis (ܪଶ ) for which an 
insignificant industry effect is found. In order to obtain a significant industry effect, companies in the 
same industry need to disclose similar risk information. Since the UK listed companies disclosed more 
risk information than Malaysian listed companies, grouping them together to examine the industry 
effect is very unlikely to observe a significant relationship between the industry classification and extent 
of risk disclosure.  
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Table 11. Results of independent Sample t-test for RM_Index 
 Country N Mean  Standard Deviation 
UK 20 0.3917 0.1643 
Malaysia 20 0.2683 0.1599 
    t statistic 2.4060 
  p-value 0.0211**     
Note: ** indicates significant at 5%. 
 
Table 12. Results of Independent Sample t-test for RE_Index   
Country N Mean  Standard Deviation 
UK 20 0.5015 0.1581 
Malaysia 20 0.3618 0.1608 
    t statistic   2.7703 
  p-value   0.0086***     
Note: *** indicates significant at 1%. 
 
The coefficient of level of risk, measured by debt to assets ratio, is found to be statistically 
insignificant in influencing the extent of risk disclosure. It is therefore rejecting the fifth hypothesis 
(ܪହ).This is consistent with the results obtained by Linsley and Shrives (2006), Abraham and Cox (2007) 
and Amran et al. (2009). Nevertheless, the positive coefficient suggests that companies with higher level 
of risk disclosed more risk related information in the annual reports as these companies need to explain 
to its stakeholders for higher risks taken as well as the risk management policy in place to protect the 
ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ?ƐǁĞĂůƚŚ. 
The last hypothesis is concerned with the relationship between the extent of risk disclosure and 
the profitability of the companies. The coefficient of profitability is found to be statistically insignificant 
in this research study, therefore, rejecting two forms of the sixth hypothesis (ܪହ௔ܽ݊݀ܪହ௕). This result is 
consistent with the previous empirical findings by Troster (2005) and Alsaeed (2006). Notwithstanding, 
the positive coefficient indicates that companies that earned higher profit scored higher in TDI. As 
explained by Deumes and Knechel (2008), profitable companies have more resources available to invest 
in their reporting system. Nevertheless, this explanation seem to be very weak in explaining for a 
positive relationship as companies are more inclined to reinvest their earnings into positive NPV projects 
or to distribute the earnings as dividends to their shareholders.    
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8. Conclusions, Limitations and Recommendations 
The aim of this paper is to examine the nature and extent of risk disclosures in the annual 
reports of UK and Malaysian companies by using the disclosure index. There are two major categories of 
disclosure that form the total disclosure index (TDI). These two categories are referred to the risk 
management disclosure and risk exposure disclosure. The results show that both the UK and Malaysian 
companies disclosed most of their risk information related to financial risks such as foreign exchange risk, 
interest rate risk, credit risk, and liquidity risk, consistent with the findings from Lajili and Zegnal (2005) 
ĂŶĚĞƌŐĞƌĂŶĚ'ůĞŝɴŶĞƌ (2006). This is because both the UK and Malaysian companies are subjected to 
IFRS and FRS, respectively, which require the disclosure of financial instruments. This result further 
suggests the importance of accounting standard setters in playing a role for a better risk reporting 
regime. Although the level of financial risk disclosures, in overall, is not relatively high, a mandatory risk 
reporting regime is still deemed to be crucial in moving towards a more transparent risk disclosures in 
the annual reports.  Besides that, it is found that the UK companies disclosed more risk information than 
Malaysian companies, in overall, for both risk management and risk exposures disclosure. This is in line 
with the results obtained by Amran et al. (2009) who found that risk disclosure by Malaysian companies 
is very much less compared to findings from Linsley and Shrives (2006) who examined the risk disclosure 
practices of UK companies as the risk reporting in Malaysia is still at an infancy stage.  
 Both the Malaysian and UK companies are found to quantify most of the risk exposures from 
the financial aspect rather than the non-financial risk exposure as most of the popular measurement 
tools and models for quantifying the risk exposure such as VaR, sensitivity analysis and CAPM are meant 
for the measurement of financial risks. On the other hand, both the UK and Malaysian companies have 
fairly high percentage scores for disclosing forward-looking risk information in the annual reports, of 
which UK companies disclosed more than Malaysian companies. This is consistent with the results found 
by Linsley and Shrives (2006) who indicated that companies did exhibit a willingness to disclose their 
future risk information to its stakeholders.  
There are only four UK companies that disclosed in their annual reports their risk appetite while 
none of the Malaysian companies doing so and the disclosure level for risk appetite of these four UK 
companies is of moderate. Most of the UK and Malaysian companies have a specific section for 
explaining risk and risk management related information. This is because UK companies are required by 
the Company Act 2006 to have a specific section for disclosing their principal risks and uncertainties and 
actions taken to mitigate the risks in a particular section. Malaysian companies, on the other hand, 
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report most of their risk in the statement of internal control as required by the Listing Requirements of 
Bursa Malaysia. There are only few UK and Malaysian companies that disclosed whether they are 
implementing ERM and the existence of the risk committee in governing the risk management system. 
This shows that the most of the companies are yet prepared to adopt the ERM framework despite its 
benefits. As mentioned by (Simkins and Ramirez,), the difficulty involved in implementing ERM and the 
need for more information to establish a proper ERM system often deter the companies from doing it.  
In addition, this paper also seeks to test the relationship between firm characteristics and the 
level of risk disclosures. The empirical relationships between level of risk disclosures and company size, 
industry, foreign listing status, country of domicile, level of risk and profitability are tested. Corporate 
size, measured as the logarithm of total sales, is found to be positive and statistically significant. This 
indicates that larger companies disclose more risk information in the annual reports as they need to 
account for a larger pool of stakeholders. Besides that, larger companies are also able to exploit for a 
lower marginal costs for additional risk information to be reported. The result is consistent with the 
findings of prior literature (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Amran et al., 2009; 
Vandemaele et al., 2009; Horing and Grundl, 2011).  The nature of industry is found to be insignificant in 
explaining the TDI. This is in line with the findings of Wallace et al. (1994), Alsaeed (2006) and Aljifri and 
Hussainey (2007). The possible explanation for an insignificant association between industry 
classification and level of risk disclosure is that companies from UK and Malaysia are subjected to 
different domestic regulations even though that both the companies are from the same industry field 
and subjected to similar reporting standards.  Foreign listing status found to be positive and significant 
in explaining the extent of risk disclosures. This implies that companies that listed on other foreign stock 
exchanges disclosed more risk information in the annual reports as these companies need to adhere to 
the listing requirements in that country (Abraham and Cox ,2007). Country effect, on the other hand, is 
found to be positive and statistically significant. The positive coefficient suggests that UK companies 
disclosed more risk information than Malaysian companies.  This is consistent with the findings of 
Amran et al. (2009) who found that Malaysian listed companies reported very much less risk information 
in the annual reports compared to UK companies. Independent sample t tests are carried out for 
RM_Index and RE_Index, respectively. The results obtained further strengthen the hypothesis tested on 
the variables of country effect. It is found that UK companies have a higher mean for RM_Index and 
RE_Index compared to Malaysian companies. The coefficient of level of risk, measured by debt to assets 
ratio, is found to be statistically insignificant in influencing the extent of risk disclosure, consistent with 
the results obtained by Linsley and Shrives (2006), Abraham and Cox (2007) and Amran et al. (2009). 
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Lastly, profitability is found to be statistically insignificant in this research study, consistent with the 
previous empirical findings by Troster (2005) and Alsaeed (2006). 
As with other empirical studies, this research study is also subjected to several limitations. Firstly, 
the sample size for this study is relatively small compared to the prior research studies. Robb et al. (2001) 
included in their sample size of at least fifty-three companies for each country when examining the level 
of disclosure across three Anglo-American countries. For this research study, a total of forty annual 
reports were examined where twenty annual reports were selected from UK and Malaysian companies, 
respectively. Besides that, there are only five companies chosen for each industry to capture the 
industry effect. From the multiple regression analysis, the industry effect is found not to be significant. 
The possible explanation is that there is an offsetting effect for which the industry effect is to be 
cancelled out by the country effect. However, the insignificant result can also be driven by the small 
sample size chosen as a representative for each industry and therefore the inadequacy in capturing the 
industry trend in reporting risk. Secondly, TDI is composed of only 32 disclosure items in which 15 items 
were designed to measure the level of disclosure on risk management information and 17 items were 
designed to measure the level of disclosure on risk exposures information. The number of disclosure 
items is again relatively small and therefore might not be able to capture the whole picture of the 
nature and extent of the risk disclosure practices. Thirdly, the use of a weighted disclosure index 
inevitably involves some subjectivity associated with scoring the disclosure items. Nevertheless, Linsley 
and Shrives (2006) argued that subjectivity is hardly to be wholly eliminated and therefore the results 
obtained need to be interpreted with caution.  
 This paper has extended the knowledge in the literature of risk disclosure which is of limited in 
number. This paper examines the variability of risk disclosure across countries, the UK and Malaysia. 
Insofar, none of the prior risk disclosure studies investigate the risk disclosure practices of non-financial 
companies across countries and hence the need for additional research to close the gap in the literature 
of cross-country risk disclosure. While this paper focuses mainly on the extent of risk information being 
disclosed in the annual reports, future cross-country risk disclosure research can further examine the 
quality of risk information disclosed from the point of view of investors since investors are the main user 
of information disclosed by the companies.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Listed companies selected for this study 
Country Industry Firm's name 
UK Construction Redrow Plc 
    Costain Group Plc 
    Galliford Try Plc 
    Balfour Beatty Plc 
    Bellway Plc 
  Technology ARM Holdings Plc 
    Densitron Technologies Plc 
    Elektron Plc 
    Transense Technologies Plc 
    APC Plc 
  Retailing JD Sports Fashion Plc 
    Sports Direct International Plc 
    JJB Sports Plc 
    Next Plc 
    Asos Plc 
  Telecommunication BT Group Plc 
    Vodafone Group Plc 
    Avanti Communications Plc 
    Inmarsat Plc 
    Monitise Group Plc 
Malaysia Construction PJ Development Holdings Bhd 
    MK Land Property Holdings Bhd 
    Crest Builder Holdings Bhd 
    BRDB 
    Fajarbaru Builder Group Bhd 
  Technology D&O Green Technologies Bhd 
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    Kumpulan High-Tech Bhd 
    Kobay Technology Bhd 
    Eng Teknologi Holdings Bhd 
    P.I.E Industrial Bhd 
  Retailing Aeon Co. (M) Bhd 
    Voir Holdings Bhd 
    Padini Holdings Bhd 
    Kamdar Group (M) Bhd 
    Parkson Holdings Bhd 
  Telecommunication Telekom Malaysia Bhd 
    Axiata Group Bhd 
    DiGi.Com Bhd 
    Maxis Bhd 
    TIME dotcom Bhd 
 
Appendix 2 
Disclosure items that form the Risk Management Disclosure Index (RM_Index) 
1) Did the Board explain their risk appetite? 
2) Did the annual report have a section for explaining risk and risk management? 
3) Did the company refer to Enterprise Risk Management (ERM)? 
4) ŝĚƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞŝƚƐƌŝƐŬŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?
5) Did the company disclose whether it has a risk committee/board risk committee/executive risk 
committee? 
6) Did the company identify changes it has made to its risk management system in 2010? 
7) Did the company disclose its KPIs and/or other risk factors? 
8) Did the company disclose its management of foreign exchange risk? 
9) Did the company disclose its management of interest rate risk? 
10) Did the company disclose its management of commodity risk? 
11) Did the company disclose its management of credit risk? 
12) Did the company disclose its management of liquidity risk? 
13) Did the company disclose its management of operational risk? 
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14) Did the company disclose its management of legal, tax and regulatory risk? 
15) Did the company disclose its management of business, strategic and reputation risk? 
Disclosure items that form the Risk Exposure Disclosure Index (RE_Index) 
18) Did the company disclose forward looking risk information? 
19) Did the company disclose whether it is exposed to foreign exchange risk? 
20) Did the company quantify its exposure to foreign exchange risk? 
21) Did the company disclose whether it is exposed to interest rate risk? 
22) Did the company quantify its exposure to interest rate risk? 
23) Did the company disclose whether it is exposed to commodity risk? 
24) Did the company quantify its exposure to commodity risk? 
25) Did the company disclose whether it is exposed to credit risk? 
26) Did the company quantify its exposure to credit risk? 
27) Did the company disclose whether it is exposed to liquidity risk? 
28) Did the company quantify its exposure to liquidity risk? 
29) Did the company disclose whether it is exposed to operational risk? 
30) Did the company quantify its exposure to operational risk? 
31) Did the company disclose whether it is exposed to legal, tax and regulatory risk? 
32) Did the company quantify its exposure to legal, tax and regulatory risk? 
33) Did the company disclose whether it is exposed to business, strategic and reputational risk? 
34) Did the company quantify its exposure to business, strategic and reputational risk? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69 
 
Appendix 3 
ŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ?ƐĐŽƌĞƐŽĨdŽƚĂůŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞ/ŶĚĞǆ ?d/ ?ĂŶĚŝƚƐƐƵď-indices (RM_Index and RE_Index) 
UK-Construction companies 
Disclosure items on risk management information     
No. Redrow Costain  Galliford Try 
Balfour 
Beatty Bellway 
1 0 0 1 0 0 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
3 0 0 0 1 0 
4 1 2 1 2 0 
5 0 0 0 1 0 
6 0 1 0 1 0 
7 1 1 1 2 1 
8 0 1 1 2 0 
9 1 1 1 2 0 
10 0 0 0 2 0 
11 0 2 1 2 0 
12 2 2 1 2 2 
13 2 2 1 2 2 
14 0 2 1 1 1 
15 2 0 2 2 2 
RMSOCRE 11 16 13 24 10 
RM_Index 0.3667 0.5333 0.4333 0.8000 0.3333 
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Disclosure items on risk exposures information     
No. Redrow Costain  Galliford Try 
Balfour 
Beatty Bellway 
1 0 2 1 2  0 
2 1 2 2 2  0 
3 1 2 2 2  0 
4 2 1 2 2 1 
5 2 1 2 2 1 
6 0 0 1 2  0 
7 0 0 0 1  0 
8 0 2 2 2 1 
9 0 2 2 2  0 
10 1 2 1 2 1 
11 1 2 0 1  0 
12 2 2 1 2 2 
13 0 2 2 1  0 
14 2 0 1 1 1 
15 0 0 1 0  0 
16 1 2 2 2 2 
17 1 0 0 0  0 
RESCORE 14 22 22 26 9 
RE_Index 0.4118 0.6471 0.6471 0.7647 0.2647 
TDI 0.3906 0.5938 0.5469 0.7813 0.2969 
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Malaysia  ? Construction companies 
Disclosure items on risk management information     
No. 
PJ 
Development 
MK Land 
Property Crest Builder BRDB 
Fajarbaru 
Builder 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 1 1 1 0 
3 0 1 1 0 0 
4 1 1 0 0 0 
5 2 0 1 0 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 
8 0 0 0 1 0 
9 0 1 1 2 1 
10 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 1 1 2 1 
12 1 1 1 0 1 
13 0 1 0 0 0 
14 0 0 0 0 0 
15 1 0 0 2 0 
RMSCORE 6 7 6 8 3 
RM_Index 0.2000 0.2333 0.2000 0.2667 0.1000 
      Disclosure items on risk exposure information     
No. 
PJ 
Development 
MK Land 
Property Crest Builder BRDB 
Fajarbaru 
Builder 
1 0 0 0 1 0 
2 1 0 0 2 0 
3 0 0 0 2 0 
4 1 1 2 2 1 
5 1 0 0 2 0 
6 0 0 0 1 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 
8 1 1 1 2 0 
9 1 1 1 1 1 
10 1 1 1 1 0 
11 0 0 0 1 1 
12 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 
14 2 0 0 1 0 
15 1 0 0 0 0 
16 2 1 0 2 0 
17 0 0 0 0 0 
RESCORE 12 5 5 18 3 
RE_Index 0.3529 0.1471 0.1471 0.5294 0.0882 
TDI 0.2813 0.1875 0.1719 0.4063 0.0938 
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UK  ? Technology companies 
Disclosure items on risk management information     
No. ARM  Densitron Elektron Transense APC 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 2 1 1 0 1 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
4 1 0 0 0 0 
5 1 0 0 1 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 
7 2 0 0 0 1 
8 2 2 1 0 1 
9 2 2 0 1 1 
10 0 0 0 0 0 
11 2 2 1 1 1 
12 1 2 1 0 1 
13 1 1 1 1 0 
14 0 0 0 0 0 
15 2 1 1 1 1 
RMSCORE 16 11 6 5 7 
RM_Index 0.5333 0.3667 0.2000 0.1667 0.2333 
      Disclosure items on risk exposure information     
No. ARM  Densitron Elektron Transense APC 
1 2 0 0 1 0 
2 2 2 1 1 1 
3 2 2 0 0 2 
4 2 2 0 2 1 
5 2 2 1 2 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 1 0 0 
8 2 2 2 2 0 
9 2 2 1 2 1 
10 2 2 1 1 2 
11 2 2 1 0 1 
12 2 1 1 1 2 
13 0 0 0 0 0 
14 0 0 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0 0 0 
16 2 1 1 1 1 
17 0 0 0 0 0 
RESCORE 22 18 10 13 11 
RE_Index 0.6471 0.5294 0.2941 0.3824 0.3235 
TDI 0.5938 0.4531 0.2500 0.2813 0.2813 
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Malaysia  ? Technology companies 
Disclosure items on risk management information     
No. D&O Green 
Kump High-
Tech Kobay Tech 
Eng 
Teknologi 
P.I.E 
Industrial 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 0 1 1 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 1 1 0 
5 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 
8 1 0 1 2 1 
9 0 1 0 1 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 
11 1 1 1 1 1 
12 0 1 1 1 1 
13 1 0 0 1 0 
14 0 0 1 0 0 
15 0 0 1 1 0 
RMSCORE 4 3 7 9 3 
RM_Index 0.1333 0.1000 0.2333 0.3000 0.1000 
      Disclosure items on risk exposure information     
No. D&O Green 
Kump High-
Tech Kobay Tech 
Eng 
Teknologi 
P.I.E 
Industrial 
1 1 0 0 1 0 
2 2 2 1 2 2 
3 2 2 0 2 2 
4 2 2 0 2 1 
5 2 2 0 2 1 
6 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 
8 2 2 1 2 0 
9 2 2 1 2 2 
10 1 1 1 2 2 
11 2 1 0 2 1 
12 1 0 0 0 1 
13 0 0 0 0 0 
14 1 0 0 1 1 
15 0 0 0 0 0 
16 1 0 2 1 0 
17 0 0 0 0 0 
RESCORE 19 14 6 19 13 
RE_Index 0.5588 0.4118 0.1765 0.5588 0.3824 
TDI 0.3594 0.2656 0.2031 0.4375 0.2500 
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UK - Retailer 
Disclosure items on risk management information     
No. JD Sports Sports Direct JJB Next Asos 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 2 2 2 1 2 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
4 1 1 1 0 1 
5 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 
7 1 1 1 2 0 
8 2 2 0 1 1 
9 2 1 1 0 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 
11 1 1 1 1 1 
12 1 1 1 1 1 
13 1 2 1 1 1 
14 0 0 0 0 0 
15 1 2 2 2 2 
RMSCORE 12 13 10 9 9 
RM_Index 0.4000 0.4333 0.3333 0.3000 0.3000 
      Disclosure items on risk exposure information     
No. JD Sports Sports Direct JJB Next Asos 
1 2 2 1 2 2 
2 2 2 1 2 1 
3 2 1 0 2 2 
4 2 1 2 2 1 
5 2 0 2 2 0 
6 0 0 0 1 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 
8 1 1 1 0 1 
9 1 1 1 1 0 
10 2 1 1 1 1 
11 1 0 1 2 1 
12 1 1 1 2 2 
13 0 1 0 1 0 
14 0 2 0 0 2 
15 0 0 0 1 0 
16 1 2 2 2 2 
17 0 0 0 0 0 
RESCORE 17 15 13 21 15 
RE_Index 0.5000 0.4412 0.3824 0.6176 0.4412 
TDI 0.4531 0.4375 0.3594 0.4688 0.3750 
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Malaysia  ? Retailer 
Disclosure items on risk management information     
No. Aeon Voir Padini Kamdar Parkson 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 1 1 1 
3 0 1 0 0 0 
4 0 0 1 1 1 
5 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 
8 0 0 1 0 1 
9 1 1 1 1 2 
10 0 0 0 0 0 
11 1 1 1 2 1 
12 1 1 1 1 1 
13 0 0 0 0 0 
14 0 0 0 0 0 
15 1 1 0 0 1 
RMSCORE 4 5 6 6 8 
RM_Index 0.1333 0.1667 0.2000 0.2000 0.2667 
      Disclosure items on risk exposure information     
No. Aeon Voir Padini Kamdar Parkson 
1 1 0 0 0 1 
2 1 1 1 1 1 
3 0 0 0 0 1 
4 2 1 1 2 2 
5 2 1 0 2 2 
6 1 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 
8 2 1 1 2 1 
9 1 0 1 1 0 
10 1 1 1 1 1 
11 1 1 0 1 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 
14 0 0 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0 0 0 
16 1 1 1 1 1 
17 0 0 0 0 0 
RESCORE 13 7 6 11 10 
RE_Score 0.3824 0.2059 0.1765 0.3235 0.2941 
TDI 0.2656 0.1875 0.1875 0.2656 0.2813 
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UK  ? Telecommunication companies 
Disclosure items on risk management information     
No. BT  Vodafone Avanti Inmarsat Monitise  
1 1 1 0 1 0 
2 2 2 2 2 1 
3 1 0 0 0 0 
4 2 1 1 2 0 
5 0 1 0 1 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 
7 2 2 0 0 1 
8 2 2 1 1 1 
9 2 1 0 1 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 
11 2 1 1 1 0 
12 2 2 1 1 1 
13 2 1 0 1 1 
14 1 0 0 0 1 
15 2 2 1 1 1 
RMSCORE 21 16 7 12 7 
RM_Index 0.7000 0.5333 0.2333 0.4000 0.2333 
      Disclosure items on risk exposure information     
No. BT  Vodafone Avanti Inmarsat Monitise  
1 2 1 1 1 0 
2 2 2 1 2 1 
3 2 2 2 2 1 
4 2 2 0 2 1 
5 2 2 0 2 1 
6 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 
8 2 2 2 2 1 
9 2 2 2 2 1 
10 2 2 1 1 1 
11 2 2 1 1 1 
12 2 1 1 2 1 
13 1 1 0 0 0 
14 2 2 1 1 1 
15 0 0 0 0 0 
16 2 2 1 2 1 
17 1 0 0 0 0 
RESCORE 26 23 13 20 11 
RE_Index 0.7647 0.6765 0.3824 0.5882 0.3235 
TDI 0.7344 0.6094 0.3125 0.5000 0.2813 
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Malaysia  ? Telecommunication companies 
Disclosure items on risk management information     
No. 
Telekom 
Malaysia Axiata DiGi Maxis TIME dotcom 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 2 2 2 2 1 
3 2 2 0 2 0 
4 2 2 2 2 0 
5 2 2 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 1 0 0 1 
8 2 2 2 1 2 
9 2 1 2 1 2 
10 0 0 0 0 0 
11 2 1 2 1 2 
12 1 1 1 1 2 
13 2 1 1 1 0 
14 0 1 1 0 0 
15 2 2 2 1 2 
RMSCORE 19 18 15 12 12 
RM_Index 0.6333 0.6000 0.5000 0.4000 0.4000 
      Disclosure items on risk exposure information     
No. 
Telekom 
Malaysia Axiata DiGi Maxis TIME dotcom 
1 1 0 1 0 1 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
3 2 1 2 2 2 
4 2 2 2 2 2 
5 2 1 2 2 2 
6 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 
8 1 1 2 2 2 
9 0 1 1 1 2 
10 1 1 2 2 2 
11 0 1 1 2 1 
12 2 1 2 1 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 
14 0 1 1 0 0 
15 0 0 0 0 0 
16 2 2 2 2 2 
17 0 0 0 0 0 
RESCORE 15 14 20 18 18 
RE_Index 0.4412 0.4118 0.5882 0.5294 0.5294 
TDI 0.5313 0.5000 0.5469 0.4688 0.4688 
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TDI RM_Index RE_Index SIZE  TECH RETAIL COMM LISTING COUNTRY RISK PROFIT 
0.3906 0.3667 0.4118 8.5987 0 0 0 0 1 0.3583 -2.9404 
0.5938 0.5333 0.6471 9.0097 0 0 0 0 1 0.9051 -0.2116 
0.5469 0.4333 0.6471 9.0870 0 0 0 0 1 0.6227 -1.5931 
0.7813 0.8000 0.7647 9.9655 0 0 0 0 1 0.7843 -0.9091 
0.2969 0.3333 0.2647 8.8856 0 0 0 0 1 0.2569 -1.4608 
0.5938 0.5333 0.6471 8.6092 1 0 0 1 1 0.1749 -1.0174 
0.4531 0.3667 0.5294 7.3174 1 0 0 0 1 0.4594 -1.0346 
0.2500 0.2000 0.2941 7.4754 1 0 0 0 1 0.5407 -1.4652 
0.2813 0.1667 0.3824 5.8169 1 0 0 0 1 0.0939 0.0000 
0.2813 0.2333 0.3235 7.1274 1 0 0 0 1 0.5763 -1.1816 
0.4531 0.4000 0.5000 8.8864 0 1 0 0 1 0.5411 -0.5168 
0.4375 0.4333 0.4412 9.1619 0 1 0 0 1 0.7296 -0.4641 
0.3594 0.3333 0.3824 8.5711 0 1 0 0 1 0.5745 0.0000 
0.4688 0.3000 0.6176 9.5323 0 1 0 0 1 0.9212 0.4359 
0.3750 0.3000 0.4412 8.3483 0 1 0 0 1 0.4505 -0.4940 
0.7344 0.7000 0.7647 10.3193 0 0 1 1 1 1.0916 0.0000 
0.6094 0.5333 0.6765 10.6481 0 0 1 1 1 0.4215 -1.0227 
0.3125 0.2333 0.3824 6.7645 0 0 1 0 1 0.3164 0.0000 
0.5000 0.4000 0.5882 8.8753 0 0 1 0 1 0.6553 -0.6201 
0.2813 0.2333 0.3235 6.7795 0 0 1 0 1 0.3249 0.0000 
0.2813 0.2000 0.3529 8.1427 0 0 0 0 0 0.4131 -1.1953 
0.1875 0.2333 0.1471 7.8089 0 0 0 0 0 0.4468 -1.9611 
0.1719 0.2000 0.1471 7.9821 0 0 0 0 0 0.5862 -1.2391 
0.4063 0.2667 0.5294 8.1168 0 0 0 0 0 0.3902 -1.1538 
0.0938 0.1000 0.0882 7.5393 0 0 0 0 0 0.2710 -0.7857 
0.3594 0.1333 0.5588 7.5806 1 0 0 0 0 0.4575 0.0000 
0.2656 0.1000 0.4118 6.6929 1 0 0 0 0 0.1952 -1.5407 
0.2031 0.2333 0.1765 7.2321 1 0 0 0 0 0.1465 -1.5407 
0.4375 0.3000 0.5588 8.0654 1 0 0 0 0 0.3353 -0.7420 
0.2500 0.1000 0.3824 7.7775 1 0 0 0 0 0.1736 -0.9589 
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0.2656 0.1333 0.3824 8.7809 0 1 0 0 0 0.4955 -0.8335 
0.1875 0.1667 0.2059 7.5373 0 1 0 0 0 0.4319 -1.0116 
0.1875 0.2000 0.1765 8.0361 0 1 0 0 0 0.3428 -0.5849 
0.2656 0.2000 0.3235 7.6368 0 1 0 0 0 0.3890 -1.1260 
0.2813 0.2667 0.2941 8.7542 0 1 0 0 0 0.5735 -0.7312 
0.5313 0.6333 0.4412 9.2634 0 0 1 0 0 0.6217 -0.7745 
0.5000 0.6000 0.4118 9.5130 0 0 1 0 0 0.4678 -0.9814 
0.5469 0.5000 0.5882 9.0522 0 0 1 0 0 0.7378 -0.0581 
0.4688 0.4000 0.5294 9.2672 0 0 1 0 0 0.5245 -0.5770 
0.4688 0.4000 0.5294 5.2082 0 0 1 0 0 0.0381 -1.1511 
 
 
